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WHEN COWS FLY:
EXPANDING COGNIZABLE INJURY-IN-FACT
AND INTEREST GROUP LITIGATION
Robert Terenzi, Jr.*
This Note takes an in-depth look at standing and, specifically, the extent
to which increased risk of exposure to toxins caused by a government
agency's regulations constitutes a judicially cognizable injury-in-fact.
Despite over a century of case law on the topic, standing doctrine remains
in flux and ill defined, largely due to the constantly changing ideological
makeup of the U.S. Supreme Court. The lower courts are divided on the
question of whether increasedrisk of future harm constitutes an injury-infact. Using Baur v. Veneman as a case study, this Note argues for the
expansion of the definition of injury-in-fact to include potential future
injuries that resultfrom a specific governmentpolicy.
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INTRODUCTION

It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling
into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from
falling into error.
-Justice

Robert Houghwout Jackson, American Communications

Ass'n v. Douds1

The story behind Baur v. Veneman 2 is a study in irony. A vegan sues the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to bolster its preventative
3
measures against a disease that can only be contracted by consuming meat.
4
Further, the disease has never been detected in the United States. Yet,
eerily prescient, less than three weeks after the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit allows the suit to proceed, the USDA announces that
5
they have discovered the first instance of the disease in the country.

1. 339 U.S. 382,442-43 (1950).
2. 352 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 2003).
3. Id.at 628.
4. Id.
5. Matthew L. Wald & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Is Examining a Mad Cow Case, First in
Country, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 24,2003, at Al.
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One would think that a vegan would be the last person to bring suit
against the U.S. government alleging fear of contracting mad cow disease,
because mad cow can only be transmitted to humans by consuming tainted
meat. 6 Yet, in 2002 that is exactly what Gene Baur did, with the help of his
brother, Michael Baur, a "frequent consumer of meat. ' 7 Gene Baur, an
animal rights activist, vegan, and founder of Farm Sanctuary, an animal
rights advocacy group, wanted to do something about the way
slaughterhouses treat their cattle.8 Gene believes that animals have souls
and that the government has a duty to protect animal rights, and he has
fought for over thirty years to advance this agenda. 9 One aspect of the
slaughtering process, in particular, seemed unusually cruel. When a cow
collapses on its way to the slaughterhouse, it is dragged the remaining
distance and then killed, butchered, and distributed for human
consumption. 10
The inability to walk and maintain basic motor functions happens to be
one of the only visible symptoms of mad cow disease, a neurological
disorder that destroys the brain matter of cows. 11 The disease can be
transmitted to humans in the form of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
(vCJD), a rare and fatal human neurodegenerative condition that, as one
writer described, "murders by driving its young victims insane, then
melting their brains."' 12 Gene decided that the best way to stop cows from
suffering the fate of being dragged to their destruction was to advocate that
the USDA ban the distribution of "downed," or "downer," cattle-cows
that have collapsed on their way to the slaughterhouse-and thereby end the
13
slaughter and suffering associated with being dragged to their death.
Gene enlisted his brother to help establish standing.' 4 Because a
substantial number of the Farm Sanctuary members were vegetarians or
vegans, they needed a meat eater to allege particularized fear of contracting
mad cow disease. 15 Relying on Michael's fear of eating contaminated
meat, their suit sought injunctive relief in the form of a ban on the
distribution of downer cattle.16

6. Baur, 352 F.3d at 628.

7. Interview with Michael Baur, Assoc. Professor, Fordham Univ., in N.Y., N.Y. (Nov.
22, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with Baur].
8. Id. See generally Farm Sanctuary, http://farmsanctuary.org (last visited Oct. 30,
2009).
9. See Interview with Baur, supra note 7.
10. See FARM SANCTUARY, THE WELFARE OF CATTLE IN BEEF PRODUCTION § 5.5 (2005),
available at http://farmsanctuary.org/mediacenter/assets/reportsbeef.pdf.
11. See Douglas Gantenbein, Mad Cows Come Home, SLATE, Jan. 5, 2004,
http://slate.msn.com/id/2093396/index.html.
12. David Plotz, Mad Cow Disease, SLATE, Jan. 26, 2001, http://www.slate.com/id/97774/.
13. Interview with Baur, supra note 7.
14. Id.

15. Id.
16. See Complaint, Farm Sanctuary, Inc. v. Veneman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (No. 01 Cv 9877), 2001 WL 34774067, vacatedsub nom. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d
625 (2d Cir. 2003).
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The biggest hitch in their argument, however, was that mad cow disease
had never been detected in the United States. 17 Further, the USDA argued,
even if mad cow disease entered the U.S. food supply, the chances that
Michael Baur would come in contact with an infected piece of meat were
beyond miniscule. 18 Yet, in an unprecedented expansion of judicially
recognized injuries, the Second Circuit, on appeal, concluded Michael Baur
had standing and allowed the case to proceed. 19
This Note examines the extent to which an increased risk of exposure to
harm constitutes a judicially cognizable injury-in-fact for the purposes of
establishing standing. Part I of this Note provides an overview of the
history of the standing doctrine, with specific attention paid to standing for
plaintiffs looking to challenge forward-looking government regulations.
Part II proceeds with the current controversy amongst the lower federal
courts in their attempts to grapple with the extent to which enhanced risk of
future harm constitutes injury-in-fact. Finally, Part III proposes that federal
courts should follow the Baur decision and allow a wider array of
impending injuries to validate standing if the potential injury is grave
enough and is the result of a specific government policy.
I. TRACING THE HISTORY OF STANDING

The standing inquiry seeks to determine "whether a specific person is the
20
proper party to bring a matter before a federal court for adjudication."
Standing is a threshold requirement for a plaintiff seeking to access 2a1
federal court and have that court determine the merits of his or her claim.
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction, meaning that cases before them
must possess certain qualities to allow full adjudication. 2 2 Federal courts
can only hear cases that both the Constitution and a federal statute authorize
them to hear. 23 A case is constitutional if it falls within one of the nine
enumerated classes of "cases" or "controversies" identified in the
Constitution. 24 Courts have developed the standing doctrine to define the
25
terms "cases" and "controversies."

17. Farm Sanctuary,Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d at 284.

18. Id. at 282-83.
19. Baur, 352 F.3d at 625.
20. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 57 (5th ed. 2007).

21. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) ("In essence the question of standing is
whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues.").
22. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 16.
23. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 55-85 (5th ed. 2003).

24. Id. at 63; see, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
25. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ("Though some
of its elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial selfgovernment, the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the caseor-controversy requirement of Article III." (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984)).
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The development of the standing doctrine is a relatively new concept in
modem U.S. law. 26 Due to conflicting ideologies on the U.S. Supreme
Court, standing is an unsettled area of the law. Yet, it is one of such
profound fundamental importance that existence of confusion amongst
lower federal courts results in inconsistent judgments across circuits and
allows for potential forum shopping. 2 7 Indeed, inquiries into standing are
an inexact science, to say the least. 28 This is partly due to the incongruous
emphasis the Supreme Court has placed on standing compared to its
traditional place in the British and U.S. common-law systems. 29 The

26. See JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY:

THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 55

(1978) ("The word standing ... does not appear to have been commonly used until the
middle of [the twentieth] century."); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of
Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 169 (1992) (finding only
eight U.S. Supreme Court references to "standing" before 1965); cf FALLON, JR. ET AL.,
supra note 23, at 127 ("During the twentieth century, courts became self-conscious about the
concept of standing only after developments in the legal culture subjected the private law
model to unfamiliar strains.").
27. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) ("We need not mince words when we say that the concept of
'Art. III standing' has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases
decided by this Court .... "); see also VINING, supra note 26, at 1 (arguing that it is
impossible to read the standing decisions "without coming away with a sense of intellectual
crisis" and classifying judicial behavior regarding standing as "erratic, even bizarre").
28. See Daniel A. Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1505,
1505 (2008) ("Standing doctrine is well-known to be a quagmire, plagued by inconsistent
results and judicial dissension."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77
N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742-43 (1999) ("[Lawyers] can predict judicial decisions in this area
with much greater accuracy if they ignore doctrine and rely entirely on a simple description
of the law of standing that is rooted in political science: judges provide access to the courts
to individuals who seek to further the political and ideological agendas of judges."); Peter M.
Shane, Returning Separation-of-Powers Analysis to Its Normative Roots:
The
Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions and Other Private Suits To Enforce Civil Fines, 30
ENvTL. L. REP. 11081, 11082 (2000) (describing challenges for plaintiffs "in an area of the
law as mercurial as standing"); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the
Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1988) ("One of the traditional
criticisms of standing law is that it is confusing and seemingly incoherent. Even the
staunchest judicial advocates of the doctrine readily admit as much .... "). Compare United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (holding that plaintiff must rely on political
process, as "[silow, cumbersome, and unresponsive" as it may be, to get access to
information regarding Central Intelligence Agency expenditures), with FEC v. Akins, 524
U.S. 11 (1998) (holding that a plaintiff had a fight to information regarding expenditures of
American Israel Public Affairs Committee, despite a contrary ruling of government agency).
29. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 168 ("[O]ne of [modem standing doctrine's]
principal features is an insistence that Article III requires injury in fact, causation, and
redressability-requirements unknown to our law until the 1970s."); id. at 169 ("In the
history of the Supreme Court, standing has been discussed in terms of Article III on 117
occasions. Of those 117 occasions, 55, or nearly half, of the discussions occurred after
1985 .... Of those 117, 71, or over two thirds, of the discussions occurred after 1980-that
is, in just over a decade. Of those 117, 109, or nearly all, of the discussions occurred since
1965." (citing Winter, supra note 28, at 1418-25; Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, US file
(July 11, 1992))); see also Winter, supra note 28, at 1374 ("[A] painstaking search of the
historical material demonstrates that-for the first 150 years of the Republic-the Framers,
the first Congresses, and the Court were oblivious to the modem conception either that
standing is a component of the constitutional phrase 'cases or controversies' or that it is a
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relatively new significance and development of standing parallels both the
Court's and the American population's concern with the rise of the
30
administrative state.
Part I provides an overview of the history of standing doctrine
jurisprudence. Part L.A explores the roots of standing doctrine and the
limits it placed on who could bring lawsuits in both early U.S. and English
law. This Part then discusses exceptions to the need for standing in early
U.S. case law, such as qui tam actions, writs of mandamus, and various
forms of citizen suits. Part I.B examines how standing quickly rose to
prominence through a series of decisions by the Supreme Court in the
middle of the twentieth century. Finally, Part .C demonstrates the
obstacles facing citizens seeking to obtain standing to challenge a federal
agency's fulfillment of its regulatory duty in federal court.
A. The Early History and Parallelsto Standing Requirements
This section examines the early roots of standing doctrine in U.S. law.
Part I.A. 1 looks broadly at the legal principles underlying the formation of
the U.S. legal system during the founding period. Part I.A.2 draws parallels
and distinctions between various mechanisms in existence at the founding
for suing the government, such as informers' actions, writs of mandamus,
qui tam actions, and modem standing doctrine.
1. The Framing to the 1920s
From the founding of the United States to 1920, standing had almost no
place in U.S. law. 3 1 History from the framing of the United States shows
that, up until the 1920s, courts relied exclusively on Congress to define
causes of action and did not place further limitations upon who could bring
suit. 32 Courts believed that Congress had an unrestrained power to
articulate causes of action. 33 Plaintiffs could come to court and present
their claims if either the common law or a statute gave them the power to do
so. 34 There was no explicit constitutional limit on Congress's power to
confer standing. 35 Thus, courts viewed their responsibility in standing
prerequisite for seeking governmental compliance with the law."); supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
30. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 23, at 127 (arguing that "the advent of the
administrative state" and questions regarding "who, if anyone, should be able to sue"
governmental agencies to ensure compliance with the Constitution and statutes "intended to
protect broadly shared interests of large numbers of citizens" led to the Court becoming
"self-conscious" about standing doctrine).
31. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 28, at 11085; Sunstein, supra note 26, at 170.
32. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 170.
33. Id. ("No one believed that the Constitution limited Congress' power to confer a
cause of action.").
34. Cf id. ("People with a concrete interest could not bring suit unless the common law,
or some other source of law, said so. But if a source of law conferred a right to sue,
'standing' existed ....
35. Id.
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cases as limited to determining whether Congress authorized the cause of
action, and not whether the plaintiff had a sufficiently "particularized"
dispute with the defendant to create an injury-in-fact for constitutional
purposes.

36

The lack of an injury-in-fact requirement before 1920 has important
implications for understanding modem standing doctrine.
Since the
framing, federal courts have understood that their power to adjudicate cases
depends on congressional and constitutional authorization. 37 The U.S.
Constitution urges that "the judicial power shall extend to all Cases . . .
[and] Controversies" between or affecting a specified set of parties and
concerning a set of issues. 38 The "case or controversy" requirement is an
important check on the judiciary, allowing the third branch of the federal
government to exercise its powers in only a specific set of circumstances. 39
In early U.S. standing doctrine jurisprudence, the courts looked only to
congressional action and the constitutional limits of their authority to
determine standing.4 0 If Congress had statutorily authorized a cause of
action, and it was within the limits of the Constitution, standing was valid. 4 1
Courts determined a plaintiffs standing based on whether the plaintiff had
suffered "harm" or a "legal injury."'42 Only the latter was justiciable, while
the former was damnum absque injuria.43 The Article III requirement of a
case or controversy limited the types of disputes before federal courts, but it
did so based on whether Congress or some other source of law created a
cause of action, not on whether the plaintiff suffered an injury-in-fact. 44
There is historical evidence that the injury-in-fact requirement never
existed in common-law jurisprudence. 4 5 Looking at both English and U.S.
36. Id. at 170 n.30 (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As an Essential
Element of the Separationof Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 885 (1983)).
37. See Winter, supra note 28, at 1394-95 ("[T]he English, colonial, and postconstitutional practices suggest that the contemporaneous understanding of the 'case or
controversy' clause considered as justiciable actions concerning general governmental
unlawfulness, even in the absence of injury to any specific person, and even when
prosecuted by any common citizen with information about the alleged illegality. In other
words, there was a public rights model structured in terms of alternative schemata.").
38. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
39. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 passim (1992).
40. Winter, supra note 28, at 1381-82 ("At the time of the Framers and in succeeding
generations, American law provided several constitutionally acceptable models for the
adjudication of group rights at the behest of any member of the public, without regard to the
necessity of personal interest, injury, or standing.").
41. Cf Sunstein, supra note 26, at 170 ("If neither Congress nor the common law had
conferred a right to sue, no case or controversy existed.").
42. Id. at 171.
43. Damnum absque injuria is Latin for "harm without injury." It refers to an injury
incurred for which there is no legal remedy. For example, losses from fair competition are
damnum absque injuria.BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 449 (9th ed. 2009).
44. Cf Sunstein, supra note 26, at 169 ("What of 'injury in fact'? No court referred to
this phrase before ...

1970.").

45. Id. at 171 ("In both England and America, actions by strangers, or by citizens in
general, were fully permissible and indeed familiar."); see also supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
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history, there is ample evidence that citizens could bring lawsuits on behalf
46
of their interests, without needing to prove specific or particularized harm.
In England, standing, as understood in its present form, was determined and
validated by a writ covering the plaintiff's complaint. 47 The relationship of
the plaintiff to the defendant did not require the particularity that current
injury-in-fact requirements impose on plaintiffs. Suits "by a stranger" are
specifically authorized in several sources of eighteenth century English
law. 48 The existence of several forms of "stranger suits" has important
implications for contemporary standing requirements.
2. Writs of Mandamus and Other Legal Means of Suing the Government
a. Writs of Mandamus
Some scholars today contest the idea that injury-in-fact is a fundamental
part of the U.S. or English legal system based on the existence and use of
writs of mandamus. 49 A writ of mandamus is a directive issued by a higher
court to compel a lower court or a government officer to perform a
mandatory duty correctly. 50 Several states at the founding authorized suits
by citizens explicitly. 5 1 The existence of the writ of mandamus, coupled
with historical evidence from both the early U.S. states and England, led
Professor Louis Jaffe to conclude that "the public action-an action brought
by a private person primarily to vindicate the public interest in the
obligations-has long been a feature of our English
enforcement of public
52
and American law."

46. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 170.
47. Id.at 171. For more evidence substantiating the historical claims in this piece, see
Raoul Berger, Standing To Sue in Public Actions: Is It a ConstitutionalRequirement?, 78
YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions,
74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1269-82 (1961); Winter, supra note 28, at 1394-425.
48. See, e.g., 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 602 (Thomas Gale

ed., 2004) (1797) ("And the kings courts that may award prohibitions, being informed either
by the parties themselves, or by any stranger, that any court temporall or ecclesiasticall doth
hold plea of that ... may lawfully prohibit the same ....");Sunstein, supra note 26, at
171-72 (listing several other instances where a citizen, or stranger, could bring suit against
the government). Sunstein explains that the writ of mandamus is a close corollary to the
notion that both English and early American law were familiar with citizen suits. Id. at 172
("The mandamus action is closely related to the modem citizen suit. The purpose of the
mandamus action is to require the executive branch to do what the law requires it to do. This
is the same idea that underlies the citizen suit, most conspicuously in the environmental
area.").
49. See Louis L. Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review: PrivateActions, 75 HARv.
L. REv. 255, 302 (1961); Shane, supra note 28, at 11085 ("Early state and federal practice
confirm the justiciability of 'stranger' suits."); Sunstein, supra note 26, at 171 ("Before and
at the time of the framing, the English practice was to allow strangers to have standing in
many cases involving the ancient prerogative writs.").
50. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 43, at 1046-47.

51. See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 47, at 1275-82.
52. Jaffe, supra note 49, at 302.
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At a federal level, the history is a bit murkier, though still indicative of an
accepted tradition of citizen suits. 53 Despite the lack of an explicit
mandate, the Supreme Court did allow, on several occasions, citizen suits,
where an individual citizen brought suit to compel government action
without alleging particular or specific harm. 54 In Union Pacific Railroad
Co. v. Hall,55 merchants brought suit to force the railroad company, a
federally chartered entity, to create a new railroad line. 56 The merchants
sued "to compel the Union Pacific Railroad Company to operate its road as
required by law," under a general mandamus statute. 57
Despite
58
admonishment from the Court, the suit proceeded.
b. Qui Tam and Informers 'Actions
While the Court has sent mixed messages regarding citizen suits,
Congress clearly contemplated and authorized citizen suits in the form of
two judicial mechanisms enacted to empower citizens to bring suit, no
matter the nature of their grievance: Qui tam actions and informers'
actions. 59 Qui tam actions allow a citizen to bring suits against offenders of
60
the law even if they have no direct personal interest in the case.
Informers' actions authorize private citizens to sue other private actors for
breaking a criminal or civil law, and recover a portion of the penalty or
reward. 6 1 The history of both qui tam and informers' actions suggests that
Congress, in the eighteenth century, wanted citizens to have the power to
62
compel government action.
Early congressional statutes authorized qui tam actions for the
enforcement of a plethora of both civil and criminal actions. 63 As recently
53. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 174 ("At the national level, there is no clear American
tradition of reliance on the prerogative writs .... Congress did not choose explicitly to create
general mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari jurisdiction ....
").
54. See, e.g., Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905) ("Statutes providing for actions
by a common informer, who himself had no interest whatever in the controversy other than
that given by statute, have been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and in this
country ever since the foundation of our Government."); see also 4 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 356-57 (1924); Berger, supra note 47, at 825-26.
55. 91 U.S. 343 (1875).
56. Id.at 343-44. For further discussion of this case as it relates to standing, see
Sunstein, supra note 26, at 174, and Winter, supra note 28, at 1404-05.
57. Union Pac.R.R., Co., 91 U.S. at 343.
58. Id.at 354 (stating that the merchants were attempting to enforce "a duty to the public
generally" and that they "had no interest other than such as belonged to others").
59. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 174-75.
60. The term qui tam comes from the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se
ipso in hac parte sequitur, meaning "who as well for the king as for himself sues in this
matter." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 43, at 1368. The person who brings the suit
is a relator. Id.
61. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 23, at 155.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., id.
("The False Claims Act, a federal statute with antecedents nearly as old
as the republic itself, authorizes private citizens--called 'relators'-to bring 'qui tam'
actions on behalf of the United States seeking civil penalties and damages payable to the
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as in 2000, the Court has affirmed qui tam actions. 64 The qui tam action's
traditional place in U.S. law provides support for the claim that injury-infact may not be a constitutional necessity under Article III to validate a case
65
or controversy.
Based on early history of U.S. jurisprudence, it seems safe to say that
plaintiffs had standing if the law granted them a cause of action. 66 Writing
in 1905, Professor Frank Goodnow observed,
The purpose of the writs is twofold. In the first place, they are issued
mainly with the intention of protecting private rights; ...

some of them

may be made use of also for the purpose of the maintenance of the law
regardless of the fact whether in the particular case a private right is
67
attacked or not.

Thus, the Court was open to plaintiffs who wanted to force government
action regardless of their personal stake in the outcome of the case. 68 Both
the historical prevalence of qui tam actions, as well as the Court's
consistent willingness to find qui tam actions and informers' actions
constitutional, suggest that the Court's recent imposition of an injury-in-fact

Treasury against 'any person' who procured payment on a false claim against the United
States."); Sunstein, supra note 26, at 175 ("Explicit qui tam provisions were allowed under
many statutes, including those criminalizing the import of liquor without paying duties,
prohibiting certain trade with Indian tribes, criminalizing failure to comply with certain
postal requirements, and criminalizing slave trade with foreign nations." (footnotes
omitted)).
64. In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
765 (2000), the Court held that a relator's interest in recovering a bounty for successful
prosecution could support standing. Id. at 765-66. The Court, however, did say that "an
interest that is merely a 'byproduct' of the suit itself' did not satisfy the injury requirement.
Id.at 773. Yet, the relator, as the assignee of the Government's claim, "has standing to
assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor." Id. The Court based its holding in
Vermont on "the long tradition of qui tam actions in England and the American Colonies."
Id.at 774; see also FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 23, at 155-56.
65. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 175-76 ("For present purposes, what is especially
revealing is that there is no evidence that anyone at the time of the framing believed that a
qui tam action or informers' action produced a constitutional doubt. No one thought to
suggest that the 'case or controversy' requirement placed serious constraints on what was, in
essence, a citizen suit. This fact provides extremely powerful evidence that Article III did
not impose constraints on Congress's power to grant standing to strangers."). But see id.at
176 (suggesting that qui tam and informers' actions were constitutional "only if dollars were
to change hands").
66. Cf Winter, supra note 28, at 1409 ("Suits by those without personal injury who were
acting as representatives of others were not viewed as raising constitutional problems under
article III.").
67. FRANK J.GOODNow, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED
STATEs 431 (1905).

68. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 177-78 ("There is no affirmative evidence of a
requirement of a 'personal stake' or an 'injury in fact'-beyond the genuine requirement that
some source of law confer a cause of action.").
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requirement lacks the hearty historical backing on which advocates of a
69
more relaxed standing inquiry rely.
B. The New Deal and Beyond.: The Development of Standing
During the New Deal and Progressive Period of the 1930s to 1950s,
standing began to emerge as a "discrete body of doctrine. ' 70 As the country
and courts struggled over the legitimacy of the emerging regulatory state,
the Supreme Court repeatedly invoked the Constitution to bar challenges to
the expansion of the federal government's power. 7' In the 1930s, Justice
Louis Brandeis invoked justiciability doctrines, such as standing, to insulate
progressive legislation from frequent attack and constant, defensive
litigation. 72 Justice Felix Frankfurter, two decades later, expanded and
73
refined these doctrines, cementing their place and importance in U.S. law.
In a series of highly relevant cases, the two Justices each developed a
number of tools designed to limit the potential of judicial intervention into
74
government action that had received a strong democratic mandate.
Professor Cass Sunstein offers an explanation of this era of standing
doctrine jurisprudence that is consistent with the early period discussed
above. 75 He argues that even though the idea of standing was a novel
one-so much so that the decisions of Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter do
not mention the word-no common-law or statutorily authorized private
right was at stake. 76 In other words, though Justice Brandeis was
particularly eager to protect New Deal legislation, the fact that Congress
had not authorized plaintiffs to bring suit against the government by
enacting a law, even in the days of the framing, would have been sufficient
77
for a court to throw the suit out and declare damnum absque injuria.
Therefore, though the Court seemingly became more restrictive, "[t]he

69. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 28, at 11093 (concluding that the Court's decision in
Vermont "only makes more transparent that an injury inquiry is not quite what an Article III
standing analysis ought to involve").
70. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 179.
71. Id.; see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 243-50 (2d ed. 2002);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 573-74 nn.23-25 (2d ed. 1988).
72. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 179-80; Winter, supra note 28, at 1374 ("[T]he modem
doctrine of standing is a distinctly twentieth century product that was fashioned out of other
doctrinal materials largely through the conscious efforts of Justices Brandeis and
Frankfurter.").
73. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 180.
74. Id. (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 154-55
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (reviewability); Switchmen's Union v. Nat'l Mediation
Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943) (reviewability); FCC v. CBS, 311 U.S. 132 (1940); Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) (reviewability and ripeness); Ashwander
v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341-45 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (ripeness)).
75. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 180.

76. Id.
77. See id.
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relevant denials of standing were . . . properly based on the plaintiffs'
'78
inability to find a law that entitled them to sue."

1. Standing: What Is It Good For?
The requirement that plaintiffs meet a certain threshold requirement of
personal affliction serves four fundamental values. 79 First, standing
promotes separation of powers ideals by restricting the availability of
judicial review to a narrow category of disputes.8 0 Separation of powers is
the idea that each branch of the government, the executive, legislative, and
judiciary, should exercise only those powers expressly designated to it in
the Constitution.
James Madison argued forcefully for the strict
enforcement of a rigid separation of powers doctrine, claiming that "[n]o
political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value or is stamped with the
authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty" than separation of
powers. 81 The desire to maintain a separation of powers has shaped the
Court's reasoning in standing cases immensely. 82 In fact, in nearly all of
the Supreme Court's hallmark decisions on standing, the Court emphasized
83
the importance of enforcing separation of powers through the doctrine.
The Court has repeatedly held that the standing inquiry ensures that the
other branches of government will not be interfered with in executing their
constitutionally enumerated powers.

78. Id. at 181.
79. CHEMERNSKY, supra note 20, at 58-60.

80. See Scalia, supra note 36, at 886 (describing standing as a function of separation of
powers). But see Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 650-53 (1985) (arguing that standing can unduly restrict the federal
court system from exercising its powers).
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 293 (James Madison) (Gary Wills ed., 2003).
82. See Shane, supra note 28, passim.
83. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997) (stating that the standing inquiry is
"especially rigorous when reaching the merits" of a suit would force the Court "to decide
whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was
unconstitutional" (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 542 (1986);
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 473-74 (1982))); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 n.3 (1996) ("[Standing] has a
separation-of-powers component, which keeps courts within certain traditional bounds vis-Avis the other branches, concrete adverseness or not. That is where the 'actual injury'
requirement comes from."); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (declaring that
standing is "built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers"); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (explaining that standing "is founded in concern about the
proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society" (citing Schlesinger
v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-27 (1974); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188-97 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring))). But see Susan Bandes,
The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REv. 227, 230 (1990) (arguing that concern for enforcing
separation of powers must also include preserving the federal judiciary's role, which can be
undermined by a restrictive interpretation of its place among the three branches of
government).
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Second, standing preserves the judiciary's limited material resources and
political capital. 84 Justice Lewis Powell, in a concurring opinion in United
States v. Richardson,85 argued that the Court "risk[ed] a progressive
impairment of the effectiveness of the federal courts if their limited
resources are diverted increasingly from their historic role to the resolution
of public-interest suits brought by litigants who cannot distinguish
themselves from all taxpayers or all citizens." 86 Noting that the
"irreplaceable value" of the federal courts lies in protecting "minority
groups against oppressive or discriminatory government action," Justice
Powell saw the development of standing as a means of guarding against
erosion of the Court's power.87 Additionally, in United Public Workers v.
Mitchell,88 the Court held, "Should the courts seek to expand their power so
as to bring under their jurisdiction ill-defined controversies over
constitutional issues, they would become the organ of political theories.
Such abuse of judicial89 power would properly meet rebuke and restriction
from other branches."
Third, standing improves the judiciary's ability to decide a case correctly
by ensuring that there is a clearly defined and specific controversy in front
of the tribunal. Standing ensures that the parties litigating the dispute have
a sufficiently concrete personal stake in the outcome to ensure good
decision making by the court, which sharpens the issue before the court. 90
One criticism of this justification is that a lawyer who both cares deeply
about an issue and would be an effective advocate of a given issue would
not be able to litigate a complaint without a plaintiff, while a pro se litigant
could litigate a highly contentious issue without the benefit of specialized
counsel. 9 1
Fourth, the Supreme Court often invokes standing as an enforcement of
an underlying concern with fairness. 92 The specificity required by a court
assures that only the rights and interests of the litigants in front of the court
will be decided. 93 However, the opposite side of this argument is that
84. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J.,concurring);
see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 59.
85. 418 U.S. 166.
86. Id.at 192 (Powell, J., concurring).
87. Id.
88. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
89. Id. at 90-91.
90. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (noting that a plaintiff must allege
"such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions"). A related justification for
standing is that it preserves the doctrine of stare decisis by limiting the ability of the
Supreme Court to deliver inconsistent opinions over time. See Maxwell L. Steams, Standing
Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1309, 1309-10

(1995).
91. See CHEMERINsKY, supra note 20, at 59.
92. Id.
93. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976) ("[T]he courts should not

adjudicate such rights unnecessarily, and it may be that in fact the holders of those rights
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standing "might be quite unfair" for potential plaintiffs if they feel that they
have been seriously harmed but the court94refuses to recognize their injury or
disqualifies them for some other reason.
2. Private Rights Versus Public Rights Models of Adjudication
From the 1920s through the 1990s, standing doctrine became a more
important restriction on the types of lawsuits citizens could bring against
the government. This section traces the development of standing doctrine
from the early New Deal decisions through the most restrictive Supreme
Court decisions of the 1970s and 1980s.
Since 1923, the Court has battled over whether the private rights model
of adjudication or the public rights model of adjudication should hold
sway. 95 The Court's decision in Frothinghamv. Mellon96 exemplifies the
private rights model. 9 7 In Frothingham, a federal taxpayer challenged the
Maternity Act of 1921 as beyond Congress's Article I powers and an
invasion of the state's Tenth Amendment rights. 9s In a unanimous decision,
the Court held that the action was nonjusticiable. 99 It found that the
plaintiffs "interest in the moneys of the [federal] Treasury" was
"comparatively minute and indeterminable" and that "the effect upon future
taxation, of any payment out of [federal] funds... [was] remote, fluctuating
and uncertain." 10 0 Further, the Court held that the administration of a
statute was the concern of the public and not any one individual.' 0 '
Thus, the Court required that common-law-style injuries be sustained by
an individual with enough specificity in order to deter a common taxpayer
from slowing the processes of government by constantly litigating the
validity of statutes. 10 2 Common-law-style injuries are injuries in the classic
tort sense-a personal injury sustained as a result of the breach of duty to
another individual. 10 3 In Frothingham,the Court held that they would not
either do not wish to assert them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the incourt litigant is successful or not." (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,
345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring))); see also Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudenceof
Article 111: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REv. 297,
306-10 (1979).
94. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 60.
95. For a discussion of the origins of Public Rights Models, see Winter, supra note 28, at
1394-99.
96. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
97. Id. In a companion case, Massachusetts v. Mellon, the Supreme Court also denied
the State of Massachusetts standing to attack the constitutionality of the Maternity Act. Id. at
485-86.
98. Id. at 479.
99. Id. at 488-89.
100. Id. at 487; see also FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 23, at 127.
101. Frothingham,262 U.S. at 487-88 ("The party who invokes the [court's] power must
be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.").
102. Id. at 487.
103. Id.at 484.
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entertain cases where the plaintiffs complaint consisted of an allegation
that the government was acting illegally, without demonstrating some
personal, specific injury sustained as a result of the government's illegal
action. 104
The Court revisited and qualified its Frothingham decision in Flast v.
Cohen.10 5 In Flast, a federal taxpayer successfully challenged a federal
spending program that provided financial support for educational programs
in religious schools on the ground that it violated the Establishment
Clause. 10 6 The Court distinguished Frothinghamas resting on policy rather
than constitutional grounds, limiting the standing inquiry as relating "only
to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial
holding in Flast is limited to cases concerning
resolution."' 107 The Court's
08
the Establishment Clause.1
The two decisions essentially frame the public rights versus private rights
models of adjudication debate. Private rights models require plaintiffs to
frame their complaints in a common-law manner, consistent with the tort
doctrine of early U.S. jurisprudence. 10 9 The public rights model expands
the class of plaintiffs allowed in court by leaving the standing inquiry at the
two pronged nexus requirement articulated in Flast.I1 0 Yet, in light of the
last thirty years of Supreme Court precedent, the only time a citizen has
proved standing to challenge government action, without a federal statute
giving him or her the right to sue, is by challenging government spending as
a violation of the Establishment Clause. 11
3. A More Defined Role of Standing-The Administrative Procedure Act
The enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 112 in 1946
sought to statutorily institutionalize the growing body of judge-made
104. Id.at 486.
105. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion ....); Flast, 392 U.S. at 85.
107. Flast, 392 U.S. at 101. Further refining their holding, the Court continued, "The
nexus demanded of federal taxpayers has two aspects to it. First, the taxpayer must establish
a logical link between that status and the type of legislative enactment attacked ...
Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of
the constitutional infringement alleged." Id.at 102.
108. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 620 (1988) (granting standing to a plaintiff
challenging a federal statute as a violation of the Establishment Clause); cf CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 20, at 96 ("After Richardson, Schlesinger, and Valley Forge the only situation in
which taxpayer standing appears permissible is if the plaintiff challenges a government
expenditure as violating the establishment clause.").
109. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 23, at 127-28.
at 128-29.
110. See id.
111. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
112. ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06
(2006)). "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702.
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standing law and provide a statutory basis for plaintiffs to rely on to
validate their standing when challenging a federal agency's actions or
expenditures."13 The law recognized standing in three categories of cases,
which were all well-established under previous law. 114
The APA
recognized standing for plaintiffs (1) whose common-law interests had been
invaded by agency action, (2) if a statute granted plaintiffs an interest, and
(3) where a statute granted plaintiffs standing, regardless of injury.1 15
First, the law recognized standing for plaintiffs who could show that they
had suffered a "legal wrong," which would consist of an agency regulation
invading a common-law interest. 116 Second, plaintiffs could prove "legal
wrong" if their statutory interests were at stake. "17 Even if Congress did not
expressly grant standing with regard to a particular type of interest or
agency, under the APA, the existence of an interest protected by statute was
sufficient.118 Lastly, the APA recognized standing for plaintiffs if a statute
granted them standing, regardless of injury. 119 The APA provided
congressional authorization of actions by people lacking traditionally
defined legal injuries. First codified as 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6), part of the
Federal Communications Act, 120 these statutes became known as "private
21
attorneys general" statutes and allowed people to bring causes of action.
The 1960s saw a broadening of the APA to include beneficiaries of
agency regulations. Courts allowed displaced urban residents, 122 listeners
of radio stations, 123 and nature lovers 124 seeking to redress insufficient
regulatory protection to proceed against the government. 125 Increasing
113. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 181.
114. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE ACT 96 (1947) ("The Attorney General advised the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary of his understanding that section 10(a) was a restatement of existing law .... This
construction of section 10(a) was not questioned or contradicted in the legislative history."
(citing Am. Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947))); see also Richard B. Stewart,
The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667, 1723-27 (1975).
115. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 181-82.
116. Id. at 181.
117. Id. at 181-82.
118. Id. Professor Sunstein uses the following example: "[I]f the interest of a litigant in
competition on equal terms was a relevant factor under the governing statute-if the agency
was required to take that factor into account-the litigant would have standing to bring suit
to vindicate its interest." Id. at 182.
119. Id.
120. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (2006).
121. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 182.
122. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 932-37 (2d Cir.
1968).
123. Office of Commc'n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000-06
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
124. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 615-17 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
125. Then-Judge Warren Burger wrote, in an influential passage,
The theory that the [FCC] can always effectively represent the listener interests in
a renewal proceeding without the aid and participation of legitimate listener
representatives fulfilling the role of private attorneys general is one of those
assumptions we collectively try to work with so long as they are reasonably
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numbers of private attorneys general statutes sought to achieve equilibrium
among a rapidly changing horizon of administrative regulatory agencies,
those entities regulated by the agencies, and the supposed beneficiaries of
126
those regulations.
4. The Maturation of Standing Doctrine
This section discusses the landmark case of Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 127 which increased the
plaintiff's burden to establish standing. It looks at the immediate aftermath
of Data Processing and concludes by looking at a series of cases that
increased the restrictiveness of standing. In doing so, this section seeks to
provide a working definition of contemporary standing doctrine.
a. Data Processing: Changingthe Standing Landscape

The landmark decision by the Supreme Court in Data Processing
changed the landscape of standing markedly. In DataProcessing,sellers of
data processing services sought review under the APA of a ruling by the
Comptroller of the Currency permitting national banks to provide data
processing services to other banks and bank customers. 128 The U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed for lack of standing and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding the plaintiff
had failed to demonstrate that a statute authorized the suit. 129 The Supreme
Court reversed, with Justice William 0. Douglas writing for the Court. 130

adequate. When it becomes clear, as it does to us now, that it is no longer a valid
assumption which stands up under the realities of actual experience, neither we nor
the [FCC] can continue to rely on it. The gradual expansion and evolution of
concepts of standing in administrative law attests that experience rather than logic
or fixed rules has been accepted as the guide.
United Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 1003-04. The general idea that courts might review
unlawful inaction was hardly inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act as
originally understood. See U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE,
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 77-8, at 86 (1941)

("[T]he problem of whether the administrator's refusal to take action is reviewable still
remains ....
In some instances review may be unavailing because the determination of
whether or not action should be taken in the circumstances may have been committed to the
exclusive judgment of the administrator as to the public interest and convenience. But if the
denial is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, judicial review is available to remove
at least that barrier."). See generally Sunstein, supra note 26, at 187.
126. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 187 ("The resulting set of legislative and
administrative initiatives generally reflected a democratic judgment that the new interests
now protected by statute-the interests of consumers, listeners, poor people, and so forthshould receive no less protection than the interests traditionally protected by the common
law.").
127. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
128. Id. at 151.
129. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 279 F. Supp. 675, 680-81 (D.
Minn. 1968), aff'd, 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
130. Data Processing,397 U.S. at 151.
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The holding "essentially jettisoned the entire framework of the APA."'131
This case was the first instance of the use of the term "injury in fact," and it
introduced "an entirely new focus for determining the class of persons
entitled to bring suit" against a government agency by imposing an
additional prerequisite to standing. 132 As a result of Data Processing,
plaintiffs had to show not only that a statute authorized their suit, but also,
when challenging the illegality of government action, that Congress
intended for plaintiffs to be protected by the law under which they brought
33
their challenge. 1
Justice Douglas found that the plaintiffs had suffered an "injury in fact"
and rejected any requirement of a legally protected interest, essentially
saying that not only must Congress authorize the suit, but an additional set
of constitutional requirements must be met as well. 134 No longer would
courts refer to statutory authorization to determine if Congress intended for
a party to have standing; a plaintiff must show both "injury in fact,
economic or otherwise," and injury "arguably within the zone of
135
interests."
The shift from an inquiry about whether the plaintiff alleged a breach of
"a legally protected interest" to whether the plaintiff had suffered an "injury
in fact" has important implications. First, the decision adopted a private
rights model of adjudication, arguably repudiating the realities of modem
U.S. politics and congressional efforts to adapt the judiciary to the
regulatory state. 136 Data Processing stands for "the idea that standing
should be reserved principally to people with common law interests" at
stake and "denied to [those] without such [traditionally defined] interests. 137
The decision raised important separation of powers concerns because of its
13 8
dismissal of statutorily protected interests.
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, the Data Processing
decision intended to simplify the standing inquiry by looking away from
"complex inquir[ies] of law ... to an exceedingly simple, law-free inquiry
into fact (is there a factual harm?)." 139 Critics have suggested that this
effort to simplify is flawed because, by distinguishing harm-in-fact from
harm that is purely ideological, "courts must inevitably rely on some
standard that is normatively laden and independent of facts."' 14 0

131. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 185; see also FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 23, at 157
(referring to the Data Processingcase as a "major doctrinal shift").
132. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 185-86.
133. Id. at 185.
134. See Data Processing,397 U.S. at 152-54; FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 23, at 157.
135. DataProcessing,397 U.S. at 152-53.
136. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 188.
137. Id.
138. Id.

139. Id.
140. Id. at 189.
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b. The Aftermath of Data Processing: Citizen Suits Revisited
In several decisions following Data Processing, the Supreme Court
severely restricted both Congress's power to authorize "citizen suits" and
citizens themselves from bringing suit against a regulatory agency,
regardless of whether they were the regulated object or the beneficiary of
such regulation. 14 1 An "object," in terms of agency regulation, is the
regulated entity; radio stations, for example are the object of Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) regulations. 14 2 Beneficiaries are the
individuals whom the agency's regulation is intended to protect. In this
example, radio station listeners are the intended beneficiaries of FCC
regulations. The FCC regulates radio stations for the benefit of those who
listen to the stations. The Court has moved away from adopting the same
standard for evaluating standing for both "objects" and "beneficiaries,"
instead putting each category of potential litigants on different footing,
allowing "objects"
of regulation more access to courts than
43
"beneficiaries."1
In the late 1980s, Congress attempted to create a series of statutes
authorizing citizen suits 14 4 that would be available to citizens against a
private defendant operating in violation of a statute or agency regulation. 14 5
The focus of the citizen suit provisions of these statutes was to empower
beneficiaries with the ability to enforce compliance with statutes,
disproportionate to their political power within the agency system.
c. Becoming Restrictive
Throughout the 1970s, the Supreme Court enhanced the restrictive role of
standing. In Sierra Club v. Morton,146 the Court refined the requirements
for a plaintiff to bring suit against a government agency. 14 7 Relying on the
APA, the Sierra Club, as plaintiff, challenged government approval of a
141. Id. at 193.
142. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 65.
143. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 188 ("After the New Deal, the very distinction between
regulatory beneficiaries and regulatory objects seemed based on a conceptual mistake ...
[T]his understanding was no longer consistent with the practices and values of modem
government. The so-called regulatory objects were in fact beneficiaries of law .... ").
144. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2006); Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (2006); Clean Water Act of 1977,
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33
U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2006); Noise Control
Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911; Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305;
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604;
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 9659; Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 8435;
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1);
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349 (2006).
145. Cass R. Sunstein, InformationalRegulation and InformationalStanding: Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 629 (1999).
146. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
147. Id.
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development plan as against its statutory decree.1 4 8 The Sierra Club
claimed that it had "a special interest in the conservation and the sound
149
maintenance of the national parks" where the development was planned.
The Court ruled that the plaintiff lacked standing because it had not alleged
50
an injury-in-fact.1
Though the kind of noneconomic harm the plaintiff alleged was a
cognizable injury, the plaintiff did not allege that he would be among those
specifically injured by the plan. 151 In other words, the plaintiffs had not
alleged with sufficient specificity that the area planned for development
would impair their ability to use or enjoy the national park. 152 The
Supreme Court held that despite "acknowledged potential public injury
from allegedly illegal environmental degradation[,]

.

.

.

demonstrable

private injury was required" to give the Court jurisdiction to hear the
case. 153 Justice Harold Blackmun dissented and relied on the Court's
decision in Flast v. Cohen to show that the Sierra Club, with ample
resources and expertise in the area of park preservation would be the ideal
154
candidate for an adversarial setting against the government on this topic.
The Court continued to limit access to federal courts by reinforcing the
importance of common-law-style injuries. The holding in Linda R. S. v.
Richard D.155 stands for the proposition that complaints that did not allege a
tort-like injury 156
would not fit into the constitutional definition of a "case" or
"controversy."'
The Court denied relief in a class action suit brought by
the mothers of children born out of wedlock.157 The plaintiffs challenged a
state policy of bringing nonsupport prosecutions against fathers of
legitimate children only, alleging that the policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 15 8 Justice Thurgood Marshall
denied the injunctive relief sought by finding a lack of standing. 159 He
based the opinion on the theory that the plaintiffs were not seeking relief for
themselves but instead were suing to force the prosecution of someone

148. Id. at 730.
149. Id.
150. Id.at 740-41.

151. See id. at 739-40. This part of the opinion was hailed as a victory for
environmentalists, although the group lost the case on standing. Robin Kundis Craig,
Removing "The Cloak of a Standing Inquiry": Pollution Regulation, Public Health, and
PrivateRisk in the Injury-in-FactAnalysis, 29 CARDozo L. REv. 149, 177 (2007).
152. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35.

153. ROBIN KuNDis CRAIG, MERCER UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW VIRTUAL LECTURE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, IMPLEMENTING A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH IN POLLUTION
ENFORCEMENT:
A PATH To IMPROVING AGENCY DECISIONMAKING AND THE PUBLIC'S
ACCEPTANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 8 (2005), available at http://www.law.mercer.edu/
elaw/public health.pdf.
154. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 755-58 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
155. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
156. Id. at 616.

157. Id. at 614-15.
158. Id.at 615-16.
159. Id.at 619.
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else--the deadbeat fathers. 16 0 The Court took issue with this both because
"[t]he prospect that prosecution [of the father] will... result in the payment
of support can, at best, be termed only speculative," and because "in
American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially
1
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another., 6
Even when presented with a common-law-style complaint, the Court
demanded a high-level of immediacy to allow standing for a plaintiff asking
for injunctive relief from a repeated injury. The Court's holding in Los
Angeles v. Lyons 162 suggested that even when harm has already been
inflicted, the Court would be extremely cautious before providing
injunctive relief to prevent a future, similar injury. 163 The plaintiff was a
man who was placed in a choke hold by police on a routine traffic stop. 164
He sued the city, asking the Court to impose a moratorium on the use of
choke holds by the police force. 165 The Court held that the plaintiff lacked
standing because the plaintiff's complaint was conjectural and hypothetical,
in that there was no reason to believe he would be stopped and restrained in
66
the same manner again. 1
The Court expressed an analogously narrow view of injury-in-fact the
following year in United States v. Richardson, when it rejected a plaintiff's
attempt to litigate whether the CIA was violating his constitutional rights by
not accounting for all of its expenditures. 167 The Court synthesized the
holdings of Frothingham and Flast by ruling that the injury was "plainly
undifferentiated and 'common to all members of the public.""' 168 The Court
also tackled the apparent difficulty in litigating the constitutionality of a
government act. The Court decided that it was an issue best resolved
through the political process.' 69 In doing so, it sought to preserve the
power of judicial review to claims that violated Fourteenth Amendment
principles, namely the trampling of a minority group by a politically
powerful majority. 170 Thus, the 1970s saw a limiting of access to federal
adjudication as the Court fomented the role of standing through
constitutional interpretation and respect for the separation of powers.
160. Id. at 618 ("[T]he requested relief... would result only in the jailing of the child's
father.").
161. Id. at 618-19.
162. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
163. Id. at 111.
164. Id.at 97-98.
165. Id. at 98.
166. Id.at 102-03.
167. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 168 (1974).
168. Id. at 177 (quoting Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam)).
169. Id. at 179.
170. Id. at 188-92 ("The irreplaceable value of the power [of judicial review] ... lies in
the protection it has afforded the constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and
minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory government action. It is this role, not
some amorphous general supervision of the operations of government, that has maintained
public esteem for the federal courts and has permitted the peaceful coexistence of the
countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic principles upon
which our Federal Government in the final analysis rests.").
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5. A Definition of Standing Requirements
In the landmark decision of Allen v. Wright, 17 1 the Supreme Court
synthesized the strands of Linda R.S., Richardson, and other cases to
enunciate the canonical modem definition of standing.' 7 2 In another
challenge to an IRS policy, parents of black schoolchildren sued the IRS for
failing to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools. 173 The
plaintiffs claimed that "the IRS . . . harm[ed] them directly and interfere[d]
with the ability of their children to receive an education in desegregated
public schools" by not adopting more comprehensive procedures to174review
whether racially discriminatory schools should receive tax benefits.
The Supreme Court held that the complaint did not meet the
constitutional requirement of a "case" or "controversy" and the plaintiffs
therefore lacked standing to pursue their claim. 175 The Court described
standing as "embrac[ing] several judicially self-imposed limits on the
exercise of federal jurisdiction."' 176 In their clearest definition to date of the
standing doctrine, the Court provided three specific requirements that
plaintiffs must demonstrate to withstand a standing inquiry: injury,
traceability, and redressability. 177 The Court held that plaintiffs did not
have standing for several reasons; chief among them was that the plaintiffs
could not show that a decree in their favor would actually affect their
children. 178 The plaintiffs could not define the causal relationship between
the tax exemption and desegregation as anything more than
"speculative."1 79
The Allen decision is important for several reasons. First, it recognizes
standing as a fundamental ingredient of judicial power, suggesting that
standing enforces the ideal of separation of powers and that Article III
courts should use their power of judicial review only as a "'last resort, and
as a necessity. ' "l 80 The Court held that granting standing to the plaintiffs
would be tantamount to making judges "'virtually continuing monitors of
the wisdom and soundness of Executive action" ' 18 1 and that they would risk
judicial usurpation of the President's power to "'take Care that the Laws be

171. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
172. Id. at 791-92.
173. Id. at 739-40.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 754-55.
176. Id. at 751.
177. Id. ("A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's
allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." (citing Valley
Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
472 (1982))).
178. Id. at 758.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 752 (quoting Chi. & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345
(1892)).
181. Id. at 760 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)).
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faithfully executed.""' 182 Secondly, by cementing standing-as defined by
the Court-into federal court precedent, the Court adopted a private rights
model of adjudication that both rejected congressional attempts to modify
the types of cases federal courts could hear and protected agencies from
litigation by restricting potential plaintiffs' access to federal court. 183
In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation184 the Supreme Court held that
interest groups who were concerned with protecting the environment faced
the same scrutiny as any other group trying to bring a lawsuit against the
government. 185 In Lujan, the Court found the plaintiff lacked standing to
challenge the administration of the Interior Department's land withdrawal
renewal program, which, they alleged, unlawfully increased mining on
public lands. 186 The plaintiff sought to overcome the requirements of
standing by submitting two affidavits of its members stating that the
increased mining would diminish their ability to enjoy the land.1 8 7 The
Court concluded that the affidavits were not specific enough to uphold
88
standing. 1

Subsequently, the Court placed further restrictions on the class of
plaintiffs allowed to bring suit against the government by holding in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife189 that the plaintiffs had to include specific future

plans in order to be sufficiently injured to qualify for federal
adjudication.' 90 In this case, Defenders of Wildlife brought suit against
Lujan, Secretary of the Interior, for plans to develop land internationally. 19 1
Again the Court rejected the claim based on standing for lack of
specificity. 192 Although the plaintiffs alleged that they had been to the
exact areas the agency planned to develop for the purpose of studying the
wildlife that would be directly affected by the government's allegedly
illegal act, the Court said that the future plans the plaintiffs had to return to
93
those sites were not specific enough. 1
182. Id. at 761 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
183. Id. at 759-62.
184. 497 U.S. 871, 894 (1990).
185. Id. at 894.
186. Id. at 879.
187. Id. at 885-88.
188. Id. at 889 (holding that "averments which state only that one of respondent's
members uses unspecified portions of an immense tract of territory, on some portions of
which mining activity has occurred or probably will occur by virtue of the governmental
action" were insufficient to support standing).
189. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
190. Id. at 564.
191. Id. at 562-64.
192. Id. at 560-62 (holding that plaintiff's injury-in-fact must be "concrete and
particularized" and "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical' (citing Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984))). Further, the Court clarified its use of the word
"particularized." Id. at 560 n. 1 ("By particularized, we mean that the injury must affect the
plaintiff in a personal and individual way.").
193. Id. at 564 ("Such 'some day' intentions-without any description of concrete plans,
or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be--do not support a finding of
the 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases require.").
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Defenders of Wildlife is an important decision because of its implications
for future causes of action. While Justice Kennedy would have allowed
Congress to authorize causes of action and define new types of injury to
support standing, the majority did not adopt his opinion. 194 As a result, the
practical effect of the holding "was to clarify that Congress could not
statutorily create a right of action in persons who have not met the
constitutional requirement of injury in fact."' 19 5
C. Exceptions to Rigidity
In three important recent cases, the Court has relaxed the bar for interest
groups to sue. In FEC v. Akins, 196 the Court recognized standing for a
beneficiary to challenge an agency's regulation of an object, departing from
previous restrictions because the right at stake-informed voting-was of
such vital importance. 197 In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 19 8 the Court went further by allowing
a private party to sue another private party for noncompliance with the
Clean Water Act. 199 Finally, in Massachusetts v. EPA, 200 the Court
recognized the right of a state to sue the EPA for failing to protect its
citizens from the future harm of global warming. 20 1 Taken together, these
cases represent a significant admission, on the part of the Court, that
standing doctrine is one that is both adaptable and less rigid than previously
defined.
In Akins, in a situation similar to Richardson, the Court allowed standing
to a plaintiff challenging the Federal Elections Commission's decision that
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was not a political
action committee (PAC). 20 2
The Court distinguished its refusal in
Richardson under apparently similar circumstances to hear challenges to the
CIA's spending by emphasizing that the Akins plaintiff was a taxpayer, not
a voter. 203 The Court held that by allowing AIPAC to withhold information

194. Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("As Government programs and policies
become more complex and far reaching, we must be sensitive to the articulation of new
rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition .... In my view,
Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give
rise to a case or controversy where none existed before, and Ido not read the Court's opinion
to suggest a contrary view. In exercising this power, however, Congress must at the very
least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons
entitled to bring suit." (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975))).
195. Ellen P. Chapnick, Access to the Courts, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
THEORIES AND PROCEDURES To ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 395, 396 (Michael B.

Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster eds., 2008).
196. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
197. Id. at 13.
198. 528 U.S. 167, 168 (2000).
199. Id.
200. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
201. Id. at 1454-55.
202. 524 U.S. at 13-14.
203. Id at 22-23
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regarding its donors and supporters, the voter was injured in fact by not
being able to make an informed decision in the course of voting. 20 4 This
case represented a shift in the Court's reasoning in that, by allowing a
citizen to challenge a government action, the Court became more
sympathetic to a public rights model of adjudication.
The Court continued to follow this line of reasoning with its decision in
Laidlaw, where the Court upheld standing for a plaintiff to challenge the
defendant's noncompliance with the Clean Water Act. 20 5 It is important to
note, however, that in Laidlaw, the plaintiff was suing a private party, not
challenging the government's actions or the regulation of actions by an
agency. 20 6 Furthermore, Friends of the Earth alleged damage not to the
environment but to its members. 20 7 Commentators characterized the
decision as a liberalization of the Court's injury-in-fact analysis, especially
compared to the Court's holding in Linda R.S., yet the Court was careful to
208
limit the applicability of its holding.
The Lujan cases and the Laidlaw decision are the most important
discussions by the Court, to date, on the issue of standing. 20 9 Yet,
Massachusetts v. EPA seems to indicate a retreat from the harsh Lujan
approach because it not only recognizes standing for a beneficiary to sue an
agency over its regulation of an object, but also because the harm alleged
had not yet come to fruition.2 10 The Supreme Court granted standing to the
State of Massachusetts to sue the EPA for failing to protect their shores
from erosion caused by the effect of greenhouse gases on the
204. Id. at21.
205. 528 U.S. 167, 173-74 (2000).
206. Id. at 177.

207. Id. at 181. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, clarified the holding of the
Court: "[tihe relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing ... is not injury to the
environment but injury to the plaintiff." Id.
208. See, e.g., Jason Attwood, Article Ill-Standing--Article III Standing Is Available to
Citizen Group Seeking To Enforce Provisions of the Clean Water Act Through Citizen Suit

Provision-Friendsof the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167 (2000), 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 795, 798, 822-23 (2001); James A. Bryant,
The Effect of Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw on Standing in Environmental Law Cases, 30

REAL EST. L.J. 97, 111-12 (2001); John D. Echeverria, Standing and Mootness Decisions in
the Wake of Laidlaw, 10 WIDENER L. REv. 183, 183 (2003); Michael B. Gerrard, The
Swinging Pendulum of Citizen Standing in "Laidlaw," N.Y. L.J., Jan. 28, 2000, at 3; James

M. Noble, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw and the IncreasinglyBroad Standardfor Citizen
Standing To Sue in EnvironmentalLitigation, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 415, 424 (2002); Robert
V. Percival & Joanna B. Goger, Escaping the Common Law's Shadow: Standing in the

Light of Laidlaw, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 119, 120-21 (2001); Steven L. Winter,
What If Justice Scalia Took History and the Rule of Law Seriously?, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. &

POL'Y F. 155, 155 (2001); Kristen M. Shults, Comment, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services: A Resounding Victory for Environmentalists, Its Implications on
Future JusticiabilityDecisions, and Resolution of Issues on Remand, 89 GEO. L.J. 1001,

1003 (2001).
209. Cf Blake R. Bertagna, Comment, "Standing" Up for the Environment: The Ability
of Plaintiffs To Establish Legal Standing To Redress Injuries Caused by Global Warming,

2006 BYU L. REv. 415, 425 ("When determining plaintiffs' legal standing to sue, federal
courts are typically unflagging in introducing their analysis by citing to Lujan or Laidlaw.").
210. 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1442 (2007).
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environment.2 1 1 This case is important because the Court recognized
standing despite the triangular relationship between the plaintiff and
defendant, which had doomed so many other lawsuits in the past. On the
other hand, the decision indicates that the Court only allowed the suit to
proceed because the plaintiff was a class composed of several states. The
Court heavily couched its decision in language indicating that the plaintiffs
received special consideration because a sovereign, as an intervenor, joined
2 12
on behalf of its citizens.
The case represents an important victory for environmental groups
because it lowers the bar for establishing standing in the environmental
context.2 13 The Court held that Congress had articulated a procedural right
for plaintiffs to challenge EPA activities, thus establishing that a "litigant to
whom Congress has 'accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete
interests,'

. .

. 'can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards

for redressability and immediacy.' 21 4 Environmental litigants face a lower
bar in establishing standing in these cases because of Congressional
authorization. 2 15 The recognition of standing as an elastic concept,
adaptable to the will of Congress, suggests a potential move towards
recognizing standing for an expanded definition of injury, inching the Court
back towards an interpretation of standing that is consistent with colonial
era decisions. 2 16 This is important because the Court has fluctuated in its
definition of standing, from seeing standing as a low threshold to using
standing to stop a wide range of suits from being heard. Part II provides an
in-depth examination of the Second Circuit's holding in Baur v. Veneman,
which expanded the breadth of judicially cognizable injuries to include
increased risk of exposure to harm. The decision has been met with both
criticism and praise as courts and commentators have debated whether such
an expansion is constitutional and proper.
II. TREATING ENHANCED RISK OF HARM AS INJURY-IN-FACT

Part II of this Note discusses the circuit court split and academic opinions
on whether increased risk of exposure to harm constitutes injury-in-fact.
Part II.A examines the Second Circuit's holding in Baur v. Veneman in
detail and then discusses other court holdings and academic literature
supporting the expansion of cognizable injury-in-fact. Part II.B discusses
court opinions, principally from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
211. Id.passim.
212. See, e.g., id.("Massachusetts has a special position and interest here. It is a
sovereign State and not, as in Lujan, a private individual, and it actually owns a great deal of
the territory alleged to be affected."); id.at 1454 ("We stress here, as did Judge Tatel below,
the special position and interest of Massachusetts."); id. at 1454-55 ("Given that procedural
right and Massachusetts' stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth
is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.").
213. Id. at 1454-55.
214. Id.at 1453 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992)).
215. Id.

216. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.

2009]

WHEN COWS FLY

1585

Circuit, and academic articles that explain the rationale for maintaining the
restrictive status quo regarding injury-in-fact.
A. Arguments and Cases Advocating the Expansion of Injury-in-Fact
This section looks closely at the Baur v. Veneman decision and then uses
a combination of Supreme Court dissents and academic articles to explain
the arguments for expanding judicially recognized injuries to include
increased risk of exposure to potential harm. Commentators and courts
argue that the historically minimal use of standing as a bar to hearing suits
undermines the separation-of-powers concerns proponents of a strict
standing doctrine advance. Further, though the Baur court expanded the
definition of injury-in-fact to include increased risk of exposure to harm
with its holding, the court noted that it should be done only when the
potential injury was grave and the result of a specific government policy.
1. Baur v. Veneman
This section first provides a brief history of mad cow disease. The
section then turns to the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York and, finally, provides an in-depth analysis of the
Supreme Court's decision on appeal, which expanded judicially cognizable
injury-in-fact for standing purposes.
a. "Mad Cow Disease"
2 17
Downer cattle have long been a sore subject for the USDA and FDA.
Downer cattle is a term used to describe cows that unexpectedly collapse
before being slaughtered. 2 18 Collapsing is a primary symptom, and the only
observable symptom, of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), which
is more commonly known as mad cow disease. 2 19 Prior to 2003, mad cow
disease had never been detected in the United States. 220 However, its
prevalence in other industrialized countries was an indication of its eventual
221
arrival.
BSE is a strain of a class of chronic neurological diseases known as
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs), strains of which can
be found in sheep, goats, cows, deer, and mink. 222 Another form, known as
217. See generally Jason R. Odeshoo, Note, No Brainer? The USDA's Regulatory
Response to the Discovery of "MadCow" Disease in the United States, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y

REV. 277 (2005).
218. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 628 (2d Cir. 2003) ("'Downed' is an industry term
used to describe animals that collapse for unknown reasons and are too ill to walk or stand
prior to slaughter.").
219. See Gantenbein, supra note 11.
220. Id.
221. See Plotz, supra note 12.
222. See generally U.K. MINISTRY OF AGRIC., FISHERIES & FOOD, BSE COMM. OF
INQUIRY, THE BSE INQUIRY VOLUME 1: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 11 (2000) [hereinafter
BSE INQUIRY VOL. 1], availableat http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/pdf/volume l/Chapter I.pdf.
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Fatal Familial Insomnia (FFI), is a condition that causes rapid brain
deterioration by completely depriving an individual of the ability to
sleep. 22 3 BSE is one of the most recently discovered strains and, unlike
other food-borne diseases, cannot be killed off by sterilizing the meat. 224
Further, TSEs can incubate for very long periods of time. 225 In cows, for
example, symptoms may not appear for two to eight years after infection
and in humans, vCJD can lay dormant and show no signs of activity for up
to thirty years. 226 TSEs cause microscopic holes in the brain, rendering it
porous and sponge-like. 22 7 There is no known treatment, and humans fall
into a coma and die within a year, and usually within four months, of their
228
first symptoms.
The BSE crisis began in England in 1986, with cows inexplicably
showing signs of aggression and problems maintaining balance. 2 29 The
origin of the disease was the food supply, which was enriched with meat
and bone meal (MBM)--essentially recycled remains of other ruminants
(animals with four chambered stomachs). 230 The British government thus
banned feeding cattle MBM-enriched food. 23 1 By 1991, the government
ordered destruction of any cow showing signs of BSE. 232
Nonetheless, animals born after the food ban still showed signs of
BSE. 233 It soon became clear that slaughterhouses and feed mills were not
respecting the ban. 234 Even in cases of accidental exposure, scientists
learned that as little as a single gram of contaminated feed could infect a
cow with BSE. 23 5 After the effects on humans and the link between BSE
and vCJD became clear, the British government took drastic measures,
destroying over 3.3 million cattle between 1996 and 1999 at a cost of 3.5
236
billion pounds.
France was similarly affected by BSE, reporting nearly 1000 cases of
confirmed BSE. 237 In total, BSE has appeared in twenty-six countries. 238
183,000 cases have been diagnosed in Britain. 239 Because of its long
incubation period, it is impossible to say how many people have contracted
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
See Odeshoo, supra note 217, at 281.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Philip Yam, Mad Cow's Human Toll, SCI. AM., May 2001, at 12, 13.
BSE INQUIRY VOL. 1, supra note 222, at 13, 198.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
See, e.g., Steve Stecklow, Hazardous Trade: Britain's Feed Exports Extended the

Risks of "Mad Cow " Disease,WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2001, at Al.

236. See BSE INQUIRY VOL. 1, supra note 222, at 19; James Meikle & Nicholas Watt,
MinistersReady To Compensate CJD Families,GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 23, 2000, at 1.
237. Odeshoo, supra note 217, at 286.
238. Id. at 289.
239. Id.
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vCJD, though in the roughly fifteen years since the first diagnosed case,
240
750,000 BSE-infected cattle were slaughtered for human consumption.
Meat from 1a each cow could have exposed as many as 500,000 people to
24
infection.
As mentioned earlier, before 2003 mad cow disease had never appeared
in the United States. 242 Yet, Michael Baur was not the only American
concerned with increasing preventative measures. In 1989, the USDA
restricted imports on beef from countries that had detected BSE-infected
meat and, in 1991, it went further by restricting all products derived from
243
These restrictions were expanded in 1997 and remain in place
cows.
244
today.
Concurrent with the Farm Sanctuary litigation, several steps were taken
within the legislative branch to ban downed cattle from the food supply,
though all were unsuccessful. 24 5 In both 2002 and 2003, a ban on downed
cattle was removed from farm bills due to stiff opposition from the Bush
administration, as well as the cattle and dairy lobbies. 246 In addition, the
U.S. Senate passed a measure that would have banned downer cattle from
the food supply chain, only to be defeated in the House by a vote of 202 to
199.247

b. The District Court Decision
In 2001, Farm Sanctuary, a nonprofit animal rights organization, and
Michael Baur, a philosophy and law professor at Fordham University, sued
the USDA for injunctive relief in the Southern District of New York, asking
the court to ban the use of downed cattle for human consumption. 248 Ann
previously denied the
M. Veneman, as secretary of the USDA, had 249
plaintiff s petition for a change to USDA procedure.
Michael Baur alleged that his injury-in-fact was due to mental anguish
and apprehension of contracting vCJD from eating meat infected with
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
Id.
See Odeshoo, supra note 217, at 289-90.
Id. at 290.

244. Id.
245. See, Sarah Lueck, Cattlemen Saddle Up for Duels over Rules, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8,
2004, at A4 ("Before the mad-cow scare hit the U.S., [Cattlemen's Beef Association] had
helped defeat legislative attempts to ban from the human food supply injured and
immobilized animals-so-called downer cattle that are at higher risk for mad-cow disease.").
246. See, e.g., Guy Gugliotta & Dan Morgan, Inspection Practices Examined: Using
Meat from "Downers" Decried, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2003, at A16; Scott Kilman, Bush
Bans Slaughtering Sick Cattle, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2003, at A3; see also Odeshoo, supra
note 217, at 296-97.
247. Gugliotta & Morgan, supra note 246; Eric Pianin & Guy Gugliotta, Banning Sale of
"Downer" Meat Represents a Change in Policy: Identical Measure Was Blocked in
Congress Just Weeks Ago, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2003, at A6.
248. See Farm Sanctuary, Inc. v. Veneman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 280, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2002),
rev'd sub nom. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 2003).
249. FarmSanctuary, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 281-82.
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BSE.250 Baur claimed that he faced particularized harm in fearing for his
safety, as he ate meat on a regular basis. 25 1 While Judge Naomi Reice
Buchwald recognized that the plaintiff "need not suffer a physical injury in
order to have standing," she required the plaintiff to show that his injury
252
was imminent.
In his brief, Baur cited several cases from several circuits where the
courts had found standing on the basis of fear of contracting a disease from
a contaminated product.2 53 The judge distinguished this case by holding
that, in those cases, "the contaminated or untested product was actually on
the market. ' 254 Thus, because the plaintiffs provided no evidence that BSE
existed within the United States, the court held "Baur's harm is more
appropriately classified as hypothetical rather than imminent. '255 The court
relied on Lyons, suggesting that Baur's fear of harm was similar to the
256
plaintiffs concern of being put into a choke hold again.
Lastly, the court held that Baur's injury was not only hypothetical, but
"too remote to warrant standing. '25 7 The court suggested that Baur's wish
that a federal government agency followed a different policy did not satisfy
the requirement of standing and suggested that the proper recourse for
Baur's complaint was through the political branches, rather than the
2 58
judiciary.
The court additionally expressed policy concerns about permitting Baur's
claim to move forward. 2 59 Citing Allen v. Wright, the court predicted that if
Baur had standing to sue, "any citizen would have standing to sue to direct
the federal government to take an action to improve health, occupational, or
environmental safety. The standing requirement would no longer be a
'260
genuine test."
c. The Appeal
Baur appealed the district court's decision and amended his complaint to
261
include studies done on the risk that downed cattle posed to humans.
Baur's appeal sought a change in USDA policy, asking them to label all
262
downed cattle as "adulterated" and thus not fit for human consumption.
250. Id.at 282-83.
251. Id.

252. Id.at 283 (citing Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 437
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
253. Id.
254. Id.

255. Id.
256. Id.; see supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
257. Farm Sanctuary,212 F. Supp. 2d at 284.
258. Id. ("The USDA has not inflicted a cognizable injury on Baur; his proper recourse is
to the legislative branch, not the judicial branch.").
259. Id.
260. Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
261. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 629 (2d Cir. 2003).
262. Id. at 628 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 331).
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The Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that
"exposure to an enhanced risk of disease transmission may qualify as
injury-in-fact in consumer food and drug safety suits. '263 The court
addressed the narrow question of whether Baur's allegation that he faced an
increased risk of contracting a food-borne illness from consumption of
downed livestock constituted a cognizable injury-in-fact for Article III
264
purposes.
Drawing on various circuit court decisions, the court found that "the
courts of appeals have generally recognized that threatened harm in the
form of an increased risk of future injury may serve as injury-in-fact for
Article III standing purposes. '265 However, not one of the string of cases
the court cited from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Ninth,
Seventh, and D.C. Circuits dealt with health, food, or drug-related
disputes. 266 This is important because the Second Circuit broadened injuryin-fact without the support of precedent that is directly on point.
Importantly, the Supreme Court has only relaxed standing requirements in
the environmental context because the mandate from Congress was so
strong and specific. 26 7 The Second Circuit used a combination of
environmental and discrimination-based lawsuits as its foundation for
finding a general consensus amongst the circuit courts in increased risk of
harm as an injury-in-fact.
The court acknowledged that "the Supreme Court has yet to speak
directly on this issue." 2 68 Yet, as in its discussion of circuit court precedent,
the court pieced together Supreme Court precedent to find indications that it
263. Id.
264. Id. at 631.
265. Id. at 633 (quoting Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 94748 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the potential for future injury "may be sufficient to confer
standing"); Johnson v. Allsteel, Inc., 259 F.3d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that
'increased risk" of harm faced by participant in a government agency's plan satisfies the
injury-in-fact requirement); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling, Corp.,
204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that "[t]hreats or risk" satisfies the
injury-in-fact requirement); Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding
that "probabilistic harm, if nontrivial, can support standing"), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1146
(1999); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(holding that an increased risk of fires resulting from the Forest Service's policies amounts
to injury-in-fact)).
266. See Cent. Delta Water Agency, 306 F.3d 938 (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation water
management plan); Johnson, 259 F.3d 885 (employee benefits); Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d
149 (Clean Water Act); Walters, 163 F.3d 430 (prison segregation policy); Glickman, 92
F.3d 1228 (Forest Service policies).
267. See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
268. Baur, 352 F.3d at 633. But see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2
(1992) (holding that "imminence" for purposes of defining injury in fact "cannot be
stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative
for Article II purposes"); Baur, 352 F.3d at 647 (Pooler, J., dissenting) ("'A threatened
injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury-in-fact."' (quoting Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990))); id at 647 n.2 ("I do not understand the majority's
assertion that 'the Supreme Court has yet to speak directly' on the question of whether
threatened harm may satisfy injury in fact.").
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too would rule that increased risk of exposure to harm in a food and drug
case substantiates a plaintiffs injury-in-fact. 2 69 Both Supreme Court cases
cited were health related. However, significantly, the two cases dealt with
plaintiffs who were actively exposed to known toxins. The Baur court held
that "the Supreme Court's analysis in both Helling and Metro-North
displays a willingness, at least under some circumstances, to conceptualize
' 270
exposure to enhanced risk as a type of cognizable injury.
The court demurred from answering whether enhanced risk "generally
qualifies as sufficient injury to confer standing," but held that "[i]n the
specific context of food and drug safety suits . . . such injuries are
cognizable for standing purposes, where the plaintiff alleges exposure to
potentially harmful products." 2 71 The court cited three cases as support for
this position; two are district court decisions, one of which the reviewing
272
court disapproved on other grounds.
Responding to the district court's holding that those cases were only
valid because the contaminated product was actually on the market, the
court held, "we can discern no reason to distinguish between uncontested
exposure to a potentially harmful substance and potential exposure to an
undisputedly dangerous contaminant for standing purposes." 273 The court
held that standing should rest on all of the facts behind the plaintiffs
complaint, "not on the happenstance of which particular facts happen to be
2 74
in dispute."
In extending the ambit of cognizable injury-in-fact to increased risk of
exposure to harmful substances, the court analogized its decision to the
"commonly recognized" equivalent in environmental litigation. 275 Beating
back the criticism faced by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
269. Baur, 352 F.3d at 633 n.7. The court cites Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993),
where the Supreme Court concluded that a prisoner could bring an Eighth Amendment claim
for injunctive relief based on allegations that prison officials had "exposed him to levels of
[second-hand smoke] that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health."
Id. at 35. It also cites Metro-North Commuter RailroadCo. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
Although deciding for the defendant, the Court noted "that exposure to known carcinogens
may reasonably cause distress." Id. at 434-36.
270. Baur, 352 F.3d at 633 n.7.
271. Id. at 634.
272. Id. (citing Pub. Citizen v. Foreman, 631 F.2d 969, 974 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(holding that standing existed for plaintiffs seeking a declaratory judgment that nitrates are
an unsafe food additive); Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1187-88 (W.D. Wis. 1995)
(reasoning that where the specific purpose of the statute the plaintiffs brought their challenge
under is to eliminate uncertainty as to health risks, the "increased risk of potential harm that
the consumer must bear is an injury in fact for standing purposes" and holding that standing
existed where plaintiffs alleged "exposure to a potentially dangerous drug whose safety has
not been demonstrated in accordance with the [Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act]");
Cutler v. Kennedy, 475 F. Supp. 838, 848-50 (D.D.C. 1979) (stating that allegations of
inadequate testing of drugs by the FDA and subsequent exposure to those drugs that had
been approved was sufficient to support standing given the resulting risk of harm), revd,
Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
273. Baur, 352 F.3d at 634 n.8.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 634.
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in Friendsof the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp. 2 76-that the
injury requirement was "by nature probabilistic"-the court hedged its
argument in common tort language, suggesting that "unreasonable exposure
to risk may itself cause cognizable injury." 277 Recognizing injury-in-fact in
this context, where there has been no actual harm and where the plaintiffs
risk of injury is the same as every other meat-eater in America, stretches the
limits of the private rights model of adjudication. 2 78 Yet, by framing the
injury in tort language, the Second Circuit sought to insulate its holding

from Supreme Court reproach.
Finding in both case law and legal scholarship another criterion for
substantiating injury-in-fact, the court held that, where there is a "tight
connection between the type of injury [plaintiff] alleges and the
fundamental goals of the statutes which he sues under," that nexus
reinforces the plaintiffs claim of a cognizable injury. 2 79 The court looked
to "the very purpose" of the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) and found that the
purpose is to "protect public health by keeping impure and adulterated food
from the channels of commerce. '2 80 The court's focus on the purpose 281
of
the statute was in step with the Data Processing"zone of interests" test.
The court used this nexus to substantiate its analytical leap in extending the
range of cognizable injuries to include enhanced risk of exposure in food
and drug cases.
Additionally, the court used Akins to anchor its decision in Supreme
Court precedent. 28 2 Specifically, it held that, just because Baur's injury

276. 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
277. Baur, 352 F.3d at 634.
278. See supra Part I.B.
279. Baur, 352 F.3d at 635; (citing Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 156 (holding plaintiffs
had standing where the plaintiff "alleged precisely those types of injuries that Congress
intended to prevent by enacting the Clean Water Act"); Cutler v. Kennedy, 475 F. Supp. 838,
848-49 (D.D.C. 1979) (stating that "[p]laintiffs' claim of injury must be considered in the
context of the comprehensive regulatory scheme created by the [statute at issue]"); Jerry L.
Mashaw, "Rights" in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129, 1168 (1983)
(arguing that some Supreme Court precedent "suggests that increased risk will satisfy the
requirement of injury in fact, at least where the statutory scheme that gives rise to the
complaint is itself essentially concerned with restructuring risks"); Cass R. Sunstein,
Standing Injuries, 1993 SuP. CT. REv. 37, 58 (reasoning that where the very purpose of the
regulatory statute is risk minimization, plaintiffs "should be allowed to bring suit to prevent
the sorts of injuries that the regulatory scheme was designed to prevent")).
280. Baur, 352 F.3d at 634-35 (citing 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593,
596 (1951)).
281. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
282. See Baur, 352 F.3d at 635 n.9 ("The dissent concludes that Baur has asserted no
more than a generalized grievance, because Baur cannot distinguish himself from the
millions of other Americans who regularly consume beef. But if a concrete harm is 'widely
shared' there is no additional requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate enhanced
susceptibility to establish constitutional standing. The fact that many other citizens could
assert the same injury, by itself, is not sufficient to defeat standing." (citing FEC v. Akins,
524 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1998))).
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may be widely shared, it is nonetheless a judicially cognizable injury. 283
Rebuffing the district court, the Second Circuit explained,
As the Supreme Court recently explained in [Akins], injury-in-fact may be
found although the asserted harm is 'widely shared' if the harm is
sufficiently concrete and particularized. Here, there is no question that
Baur alleges a discrete, individual risk of personal harm from exposure to
contaminated beef and bases his claim of standing on more than a
2 84
generalized concern that the government obey the law.
This holding ignored the probabilistic nature of the threat, namely, that the
chances of Baur actually being harmed were miniscule.
Lastly, the court responded to both the district court and the dissent's
concerns regarding the overexpansion of cognizable injuries. The court
suggested that the judicial system should rely on other limiting doctrines to
avoid the influx of new claims that its holding might foretell. 2 85 It also
cited the "zone of interests" test as "further limiting the scope of potential
citizen suits that may be brought under the APA. ''286
The court found the lack of direction from the Supreme Court in
determining standing both confusing and unhelpful. 287 In attempting to fill
this void, the Second Circuit applied a balancing test used in environmental
litigation. 288 The court determined that, in evaluating the degree of risk
sufficient to support standing, the inquiry would have to be highly fact
specific and "qualitative, not quantitative, in nature. '2 89
Accordingly, the court determined that its inquiry would look like the
famous Hand test, where the greater the potential harm, the "lesser the
increment in probability necessary to establish standing. '2 90 Because Baur
alleged such a serious potential injury, "even a moderate increase in risk of
disease may be sufficient to confer standing."'2 91
The court relied on two case-specific factors that weighed in favor of
finding standing in this instance. 292 First, the court weighed "the fact that
283. Id.at 636.
284. Id.at 635.
285. Id.at 636 ("Despite the potential expansiveness of recognizing exposure to enhanced
risk as injury-in-fact, the constitutional standing requirements of causation and redressibility
as well as the related doctrines of prudential standing, mootness, and ripeness all serve to
effectively narrow the types of cases which may be adjudicated." (citing Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984))).
286. Id.
287. Cf Mark Gabel, Generalized Grievances and JudicialDiscretion, 58 HASTINGs L.J.
1331, 1363-64 (2007) ("[T]he Court has given the lower courts little guidance as to how
they should exercise [standing decision] discretion.").
288. Baur, 352 F.3d at 634 ("[T]he reasons for treating enhanced risk as sufficient injuryin-fact in the environmental context extend by analogy to consumer food and drug safety
suits.").
289. Id.at 637 (citing Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350,
357-58 (5th Cir. 1999)).
290. Id.(citing Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1234 (D.C. Cir.
1996)).
291. Id.
292. Id.
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government studies and statements confirm[ed] several of Baur's
allegations" regarding the increased risk of exposure to BSE. 293 Second,
the court held that Baur faced an increased risk of exposure due to an
established government policy. 2 94 Relying on precedent from other
circuits, the court noted that when the threatened injury is part of a
295
government policy, it is more likely the injury will occur.
Both parties submitted papers detailing the risk of infection of BSE they
foresaw from downed cattle. 296 Several of the papers indicated that
eliminating downed cattle from the food supply would decrease the risk of
BSE in the United States. 2 97 Thus, the court found it very persuasive that
"the USDA itself

. . .

ha[s] recognized that downed cattle are especially

298
susceptible to BSE infection."
Baur relied on two studies, one by the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis
and another by the U.S. General Accounting Office, to allege that methods
then applied by the USDA were defective for detecting BSE. 299 Further,
Baur alleged that a form of BSE might already be present in the United

293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. (citing 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1266 (lth Cir. 2003);
Deshawn E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344-45 (2d Cir. 1998)).
296. Baur, 352 F.3d at 639.
297. See id. at 638; see, e.g., Risk Reduction Strategies for Potential BSE Pathways
Involving Downer Cattle and Dead Stock of Cattle and Other Species, 68 Fed. Reg. 2703,
2704 (proposed Jan. 21, 2003) [hereinafter USDA Proposed Rulemaking] (noting that
surveillance data from Europe indicates that BSE is present in a higher percentage of
nonambulatory livestock and that "[bly their nature, downer animals and dead stock include
many animals dead or dying from communicable diseases [and t]herefore represent a
significant pathway for spread of disease if they are not handled or disposed of with
appropriate safeguards"); FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERV., CURRENT THINKING ON
MEASURES THAT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED To MINIMIZE HUMAN EXPOSURE TO MATERIALS

THAT COULD POTENTIALLY CONTAIN THE BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY AGENT

(2002) [hereinafter FSIS THINKING], available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/topics/
BSE Thinking.pdf (acknowledging that downed cattle are among the cattle most likely to
be infected with BSE).
298. Baur, 352 F.3d at 637-38.
299. See id. at 638-39 ("For example, FSIS has previously acknowledged that 'the typical
clinical signs associated with BSE cannot always be observed in downer cattle infected with
BSE. Thus, if BSE were present in the U.S., downer cattle infected with BSE could
potentially be offered for slaughter and, if the clinical signs of the disease were not detected,
pass ante-mortem inspection. These cattle could then be slaughtered for human food."'
(quoting FSIS THINKING, supra note 297, at 9)); see also USDA Proposed Rulemaking,
supra note 297, at 2706 (noting that "because the signs of BSE often cannot be differentiated
from the signs of the many other diseases and conditions affecting downer cattle," BSEinfected animals may pass inspection and be offered for human consumption). Moreover, a
January 2002 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office may call the Harvard Study into
doubt by raising concerns about the effectiveness of current federal BSE prevention and
detection efforts. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-02-183, MAD COW
DISEASE: IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ANIMAL FEED BAN AND OTHER REGULATORY AREAS WOULD

STRENGTHEN U.S. PREVENTION EFFORTS 3 (2002) (noting that "[w]hile BSE has not been
found in the United States, federal actions do not sufficiently ensure that all BSE-infected
animals or products are kept out or that if BSE were found, it would be detected promptly
and not spread to other cattle through animal feed or enter the human food supply").
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States, "an allegation which receives some support from government
reports." 300 The court looked at the long incubation period of BSE and the
current methods used for detecting BSE. 30 1 It weighed against the
defendants the fact that the USDA had already taken preemptive measures
30 2
to improve their detection methods.
Second, the court rejected the district court's reliance on Lyons as
controlling precedent. 303 The court reasoned that while, in Lyons, the risk
of future harm rested on the independent actions of a third party, "Baur
face[d] a present, immediate risk of exposure to BSE as a consumer of
beef. '30 4 By refraining the inquiry as a question of present risk, rather than
a question of future injury, the Second Circuit found that "[t]his present
exposure to a credible threat of harm constitutes the relevant injury in fact
'305
for Article III purposes.
Further, the court held that despite the chain of contingencies necessary
for Baur to actually contract vCJD as a result of eating contaminated food,
the injury was "exposure to a sufficiently serious risk of medical harm. '30 6
The court expressed concern over adopting a contrary rule, which it
contended would effectively bar any medical suit where the effects of the
disease were delayed. 30 7 Responding to the dissent, the court held that
barring standing in this case would allow the USDA to effectively stop
enforcing its current regulations because no citizen would be able to
challenge its policy, as the chances of coming in contact with an adulterated
30 8
product would be exceedingly remote.
Ultimately, the court's standing analysis suggests that the injury-in-fact
requirement is not the bar that will stop frivolous claims from entering
court-a position the Second Circuit is expressly comfortable with. 309
Rather, relying on the seriousness of the alleged harm, the court declined to
use the injury-in-fact requirement as a bar for Baur's claim. The court
framed the standing inquiry as to whether "'the plaintiff is entitled to "walk
through the courthouse door" and raise his grievance before a federal
CoUrt."'

310

300. Baur, 352 F.3d at 639.
301. Id.

302. Id.at 640 ("Significantly, government reports confirm some of the risk factors that
Baur has cited, and government agencies have already taken preemptive steps to minimize
human exposure to BSE without waiting for definitive evidence that BSE has entered the
country, strongly suggesting that they view the potential health risks from BSE as both
serious and imminent.").
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.at 640-41.
306. Id.at 641.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 642 ("Article III standing requirements are not intended as a screen for
potentially frivolous lawsuits.").

310. Id.at 643 (quoting Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262,
1280 (11 th Cir. 2001)); cf id.
("Would a 0.00011% chance of exposure to BSE contaminated
beef be sufficient to demonstrate sufficient injury, or would the risk of exposure be too
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The Second Circuit followed the Fourth and Ninth Circuits' reasoning in
two environmental cases with its Baur decision. 3 11 It remains to be seen
whether the Fourth and Ninth Circuit will, in turn, follow the Second
Circuit and apply the expanded definition of injury-in-fact within their own

circuits in nonenvironmental cases.
2. Arguments for Expanding Cognizable Injury-in-Fact
Commentators advocating for the expansion of standing point to the
historical parallels, including the qui tam and informers' actions that
allowed citizens to sue the government. 3 12 As discussed earlier, these
actions present persuasive parallels to the type of actions restricted by the
Lujan decision and others. 3 13 These arguments typically suggest that the
standing requirements articulated by twentieth-century courts do not have
the constitutional roots that decisions like Allen and Lujan claim. 3 14 A lack
of history belies the fundamental importance courts claim that injury-in-fact
has in ensuring a proper role for the courts in the federal government. 3 15 In
other words, the absence of the injury-in-fact requirement in American legal
history suggests that it is not fundamental to the structure of the federal
government. 3 16 Additionally, inconsistent Supreme Court precedent on
standing has led commentators to critique the Court's jurisprudence as
3 17
disingenuous.
miniscule to merit standing? In our view, the evaluation of the amount of tolerable risk is
better analyzed as an administrative decision governed by the relevant statutes rather than a
constitutional question governed by Article III.").
311. The court borrowed extensively from the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc), and
the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Central Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938
(9th Cir. 2002).
312. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
3 13. Craig, supra note 151, at 175 ("Congress effectively allowed citizens to sue to enjoin
regulatory violations that put their health at risk, even if no individual plaintiff yet
manifested signs or symptoms of disease or other health impairment.").
314. See Robin Kundis Craig, Will Separation of Powers Challenges "Take Care" of
Environmental Citizen Suits? Article II, Injury-in-Fact,Private "Enforcers," and Lessons
from Qui Tam Litigation, 72 U. COLO. L. REv. 93 (2001); Stephen M. Johnson, Private
Plaintiffs, Public Rights: Article II and Environmental Citizen Suits, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 383
(2001); Shane, supra note 28 (arguing that qui tam actions do not violate Article 1I). But see
Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 196 F.3d 514, 526 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that qui tam
actions infringe on the President's "take care" power and thus violate Article II), rev'd en
banc, 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001); cf Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778 & n.8 (2000) (holding that a relator had standing, but noting that
"we express no view on the question whether qui tam suits violate Article II ....
315. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 190-91.
316. Compare Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation,
42 DUKE L.J. 1141 (1993) (criticizing the Court's decision in Lujan), Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative
Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170 (1993) (same), and Sunstein, supra note 26 (same), with Marshall
J. Breger, Defending Defenders: Remarks on Nichol and Pierce, 42 DUKE L.J. 1202 (1993),
and John G. Roberts, Jr., Article Il Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219 (1993).
317. See Winter, supra note 28, at 1373 ("Commentators in this group have concluded
that the doctrine of standing is either a judicial mask for the exercise of prudence to avoid
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Further, scholars point to the lack of accountability and insufficiency of
the political process to check government agencies. 3 18 Agencies, like the
National Security Agency (NSA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
and USDA are often several degrees of separation from direct voter
accountability. Accordingly, when an agency increases the likelihood that a
U.S. citizen will be injured, contract cancer, or otherwise suffer, the
political process can be insufficient to protect him from the harm. 3 19 As
standing gained importance in judicial opinions in the 1970s, several
commentators argued for a more expanded definition of injury-in-fact as a
necessary tool to check on increasingly powerful administrative
320
agencies.
Additionally, some commentators point to the value-laden judgments that
courts must apply to differentiate between kinds of harm. 32 1 Harm means
different things to different people. 322 In order to avoid courts using
normative analysis in determining whether increased risk of exposure to
harm sufficiently qualifies as injury-in-fact, these scholars suggest allowing
a wide range of complaints to qualify, especially when the statute at issue
323
specifies public-health-related goals.
B. Not Buying It
The Second Circuit clearly realized it was broadening the permissiveness
of the standing inquiry. 324 The dissent in the Baur decision along with
several other circuit courts, however, have raised forceful arguments against
this expansion.
Scholars have recognized that the Baur decision is
decision making or a sophisticated manipulation for the sub rosa decision of cases on their
merits." (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 119-27 (1962))).
318. See id.
319. Id.("The net effect [of the Burger Court's expanded use of standing] has been
increasingly to restrict citizens' claims against their government.").
320. See, e.g., Lee A. Albert, Standing To Challenge Administrative Action: An
Inadequate Surrogatefor Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Kenneth Culp Davis,
The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450 (1970); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing
Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1971); Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A
FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
321. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 181-82; Winter, supra note 28, at 1387.
322. Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 Wis. L. REV.
897, 901. Lin argues that harm is not an objective concept possessing a fixed meaning.
Rather, harm is a normative concept dependent on social judgments about the interests that
matter, bound up in social visions of the good and the bad. Id.; see also Craig, supra note
151, at 222 ("[A] standing jurisprudence that continues to privilege actual injury and to
denigrate increased risk proclaims a normative conception of harm that undermines
continued popular valuation ....
").
323. Craig, supra note 151, at 152 ("[T]he injury-in-fact analysis for environmental and
other public health-related federal lawsuits must be sensitive to the injuries sought to be
avoided through the regulatory standards at issue ....
").
324. See Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Although this type of
injury has been most commonly recognized in environmental cases, the reasons for treating
enhanced risk as sufficient injury-in-fact in the environmental context extend by analogy to
consumer food and drug safety suits.").
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indicative of current confusion amongst lower federal courts on the topic. 325
While there has been positive recognition in the courts, there has also been
vehement opposition voiced by some members of the D.C. Circuit and tepid
treatment of the holding in several other circuits. 326 Perhaps even more
surprisingly, within the Second Circuit, the holding has been met with

uncertainty at the district court

level. 327

1. The Baur Dissent
In Baur, Judge Rosemary Pooler wrote a dissenting opinion that
articulated her concerns with expanding standing. 32 8 Judge Pooler's most
forceful criticism argued that the plaintiff had not adequately alleged that he
faced injury from a future outbreak of BSE. 329 In other words, just because
Baur "asserted the plausible existence of an imminent threat to the
health... of society at large" did not mean that he, personally, had met the
threshold requirement of standing. 330 The dissent emphasized language
from Supreme Court precedent, arguing that the plaintiff must allege some
personal form of injury, "'not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way
33
in common with people generally. "' 1
Further, the dissent stressed the importance of separation of powers,
suggesting that Baur's complaint was one better left resolved by the
political channels, rather than the judicial branch. 332 Additionally, the
dissent relied extensively on Lyons, where the plaintiff was denied standing
when seeking injunctive relief from the prospective injury of being put in a
333
choke hold by the Los Angeles Police Department.
Finally, the dissent in Baur used a floodgates argument to argue against
finding that the plaintiff had standing. 334 The dissent tied the potential
325. Cf Mark Gabel, Generalized Grievancesand JudicialDiscretion, 58 HASTINGS L.J.
1331, 1363-64 (2007) ("[T]he Court has given the lower courts little guidance as to how
they should exercise [standing decision] discretion.").
326. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 1/), 464 F.3d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(comparing holdings of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Ninth, and Fourth
Circuits with case law in the Eighth Circuit to show inconsistency); Robin Kundis Craig,
Removing "The Cloak of a Standing Inquiry": Pollution, Regulation, Public Health, and
Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 201 (2007) (noting

that "increased risk injury-in-fact currently splits the federal Courts of Appeals" (citing
NRDC, 464 F.3d at 6-7)).
327. See, e.g., Nat'l Council of La Raza v. Gonzales, 468 F. Supp. 2d 429, 438, 440

(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting the "potential expansiveness" of Baur and that "Baur... has been
criticized by other courts" and holding that "the Court will not enable the expansion of the
heightened risk doctrine").
328. Baur,352 F.3d at 643 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
329. Id.at 644.
330. Id.

331. Id.(quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 477 (1982)).
332. Id. at 644-45.

333. See id.
at 646-49.
334. See, e.g., id at 648 ("Specifically, I fear that the majority's finding that Baur has
established injury in fact allows the requirement of an imminent threat of injury to be
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flood of litigation to concerns about separation of powers. 3 35 Nonetheless,
the dissent's most significant argument was that Baur had not alleged an
injury particular to him. 336 Baur did not differentiate his complaint from
the general public in any significant way, a requirement the dissent viewed
337
as part of the "'irreducible constitutional minimum' of standing."
2. The D.C. Circuit Opinions in NRDC v. EPA and Centerfor Law &
Education v. Department ofEducation
The D.C. Circuit heard the Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Environmental Protection Agency case twice 338 on the very issue of
standing, at first denying standing 339 and then dismissing the case as a
nonjusticiable question. 340 Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
challenged the EPA's failure to control the use of methyl bromide, relying
on the Baur holding that an increased risk of exposure to toxins, regardless
34 1
of its current prevalence, constituted sufficient grounds for standing.
Rebutting the Baur logic, the court first held that "the law of [the] circuit is
that an increase in the likelihood of harm may constitute injury in fact only
if the increase is sufficient to 'take a suit out of the category of the
hypothetical.' '342 This suggests that the increase in risk attributable to
government policy would have to be serious in order to qualify as an injuryin-fact.
In rebuffing the Baur decision, the court argued, "The Baur court
acknowledged the 'potential expansiveness of recognizing exposure to
'343
enhanced risk as injury-in-fact.' 'Expansiveness' is an understatement.
satisfied by the merely conceivable."); id. at 649 ("' [A]ssertion of a right to a particular kind
of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by acting differently, cannot
alone satisfy the requirements of Art. III without draining those requirements of meaning."'
(quoting Valley Forge Christian Coil., 454 U.S. at 483)); id. at 651 n.3 ("Allowing a lawsuit
to go forward on the basis of such a remote harm would be akin to saying that any citizen
has standing to sue the National Aeronautics and Space Administration because it currently
does not do enough to prevent meteorites from falling to Earth.").
335. Id. at 652 ("I must conclude that Baur has asserted an 'abstract question[] of wide
public significance which amount[s] to [a] generalized grievance[] pervasively shared and
most appropriately addressed in the representative branches."' (quoting Valley Forge
Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 475)).
336. Id. at 644.
337. Id. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997)).
338. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 11), 464 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 1), 440 F.3d 476 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
339. NRDCI,440F.3dat477-78.
340. NRDC II, 464 F.3d at 11.
341. NRDCI, 440 F.3d at 480, 483.
342. Id. at 484 (quoting Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 123435 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
343. Id. (quoting Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 636 (2d Cir. 2003); id. at 651 n.3
(Pooler, J., dissenting)). The court then quoted the Baur dissent: "'Allowing a lawsuit to go
forward on the basis of such a remote harm would be akin to saying that any citizen has
standing to sue the National Aeronautics and Space Administration because it currently does
not do enough to prevent meteorites from falling to Earth."' Id. (quoting Baur, 352 F.3d at
651 n.3 (Pooler, J., dissenting)).
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The court held that the probability that the EPA's regulation would impact
an NRDC member was so minuscule that the group did not have standing to
challenge the agency's decision.
The D.C. Circuit reheard the case after both parties submitted amended
344
briefs and overturned the panel's decision, granting the NRDC standing.
The court acknowledged that the suitability of the use of increased risk of
injury as injury-in-fact currently splits the courts, yet demurred from
providing its own holding specifically on point. 345 Instead, the court relied
an
on the relaxed standing requirements that apply where plaintiffs have
346
explicit procedural right to sue in the context of environmental suits.
Both the D.C. Circuit and the Eighth Circuit have refused to allow
increased risk of injury to qualify as injury-in-fact in instances outside of
environmental lawsuits. In Centerfor Law & Education v. Department of
Education,34 7 the D.C. Circuit found no standing where plaintiffs "allege[d]
direct injury styled as 'increased risk,' in the form of giving the States the
opportunity to injure Appellants' interests." 348 Further, the court found that
the risk of not receiving a high-quality education was too hypothetical to
34 9
validate standing.
Similarly, in Shain v. Veneman, 350 the Eighth Circuit held that increased
risk of flood damage caused by an agency regulation was not sufficient to
support standing. 35 1 The plaintiffs alleged that the USDA's construction of
two sewage lagoon ponds would reduce protection against floods. 352 The
court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing because whether a flood
would occur while the plaintiffs owned or occupied that land was "a matter
of sheer speculation." 353 Accordingly, because the plaintiffs did not
particularize when the flooding might happen, they lacked standing to
prevent the USDA from increasing the risk of flood damage by enacting
their plan. 354 In other words, establishing standing in this case and forcing
the government to change its procedure for preventing flood damage to
vulnerable property would have required the plaintiffs to tell the court
exactly when the flooding was going to happen. Shain is in conflict with
Baur principally because the plaintiffs in Shain were suing for injunctive
relief and the court concluded that the "injury" was directly tied to the
agency action, yet refused to find standing because the injury had not yet

344.
instead
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

NRDC 11, 464 F.3d at 3, 11 (failing to reach the merits of the case and holding
that the issue presented was a nonjusticiable political question).
Id. at 6-7.
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
396 F.3d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1161.
Id.
376 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 816.
Id. at 816-17.
Id. at 818.

354. Id.
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occurred. 355 Accordingly, the case is important because of its apparent
rebuff of the Baur logic.
3. Arguments Against Expanding Standing
Judges and scholars who argue for a limited and restrictive approach to
standing doctrine emphasize the "case or controversy" language of the
Constitution and note the already overloaded dockets of federal courts.
Scholars on this side of the debate point to the three fundamental goals of
standing. 3 56 First, standing requirements preserve the separation of
powers. 357 Second, standing "improves judicial decision-making because it
'assures [a] factual setting in which the litigant asserts a claim of injury in
fact."'' 358 Finally, standing ensures that the federal courts do not become a
"vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned
359
bystanders."
Focusing on separation of powers ideals, scholars argue that adjudicating
a marginal increase in risk of future harm detracts from the executive
branch's ability to function efficiently and allocates too much power to the
judicial branch, essentially allowing the judiciary to monitor the executive
branch. 360
Justice Scalia, in particular, has been forceful in his
condemnation of citizen suits and any lowering of the standing bar as an
encroachment on the executive branch's "Take Care" duty. 3 6 1 As the
dissent argues in the Baur decision, the nebulous nature of increase in risk
as an injury could allow citizens to take just about any government agency
362
to court based on allegations of just about any kind of injury.

355. Id.
356. See, e.g., Susan W. Schillaci, Increased Risk of Future Harm as Injury in Fact:
Expanding or ErodingStanding?, 10 QUINNIPIAc HEALTH L.J. 1, 41-42 (2006).
357. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1437, 1446 (E.D. Pa. 1993).

358. Id. (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).

359. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 687 (1973).
360. See generally Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen
Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1793 (1993) (arguing that Article It forbids congressional

licensing of private attorneys general in cases in which no plaintiff or group of plaintiffs
suffers "individuated injury"); Scalia, supra note 36.
361. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) ("To permit

Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance
with the law into an 'individual right' vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to
transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional
duty, to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' It would enable the courts, with the
permission of Congress, to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of
another and co-equal department,' and to become 'virtually continuing monitors of the
wisdom and soundness of Executive action.' We have always rejected that vision of our
role...." (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984);
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (1923))); see also Shane, supra note 28, at

11093 ("Justice Scalia's understanding of the primary function of standing doctrine is the
insulation of the elected branches from judicial overreaching.").
362. See supra notes 314-20 and accompanying text.
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Further, as Justice Scalia suggests repeatedly in standing-related
decisions, Congress grants the executive branch certain latitude in executing
laws requiring agency involvement. 363
Allowing the judiciary to
consistently check on the executive branch would essentially strip the
executive of the power that Congress has granted it.364 Of course, the
executive does not have the power to act illegally, so it does not have the
discretion to act in a way that circumvents the law or fails to fulfill its duty
to protect American citizens.
III. EXPAND STANDING DOCTRINE Now

Lawsuits challenging illegal wiretapping, insufficient flood damage
protection, and tax breaks for racist schools have all failed the standing
365
inquiry because the suits failed to properly allege an injury-in-fact.
Some commentators, such as Professor Sunstein, have argued that standing
is a legal fiction created by a conservative court. 366 Yet, both judges and
scholars have also argued the opposite, that standing ensures the court's
rightful position amongst the other branches of the federal government by
avoiding advisory opinions and by limiting the court's ability to adjudicate
disputes best left to the political process. 36 7 A critical reading of the history
of standing, Supreme Court precedent, and policy concerns all indicate that
the Court should expand its definition of judicially cognizable injury-infact. The test articulated by the Second Circuit in Baur strikes the correct
balance between ensuring the fitness of the dispute before368
a federal court
and limiting the potential for abuse by overzealous litigants.
When an agency regulation increases the risk of injury that a citizen
faces, federal courts are the appropriate fora to seek redress for that risk.
By applying the Baur test to agency regulations that increase the risk that
citizens will be harmed, courts can expand the definition of standing
without overloading their dockets and without cost to the power of the
executive branch. As the Baur court explained, when a citizen's risk of
being injured is increased by an agency decision, he faces a "present,
immediate risk of exposure .. .not a future risk that awaits intervening
events." 369 The Baur court created a two-prong test to determine whether a
363. See Winter, supra note 28, at 1381 ("The most appealing justification of standing
law is that, in preserving the separation of powers, it protects the majoritarian political
process from undue intrusion by the unelected judiciary.").
364. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 36 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If today's decision is
correct, it is within the power of Congress to authorize any interested person to manage
(through the courts) the Executive's enforcement of any law ....
365. See supra notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
366. See Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
HARV. L. REV. 4, 17-19 (1982); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Causationas a Standing Requirement:
The Unprincipled Use of JudicialRestraint, 69 Ky. L.J. 185 (1981); Mark V. Tushnet, The
New Law of Standing: A PleaforAbandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977).
367. See supra notes 318-26, 326-29 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 274-88 and accompanying text.
369. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 2003); see also supra notes 305-10
and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to justify standing. 370 First, the
potential injury must be grave in nature. In Baur, if the increased risk of
exposure to harm resulted in actual exposure to mad cow disease, then the
plaintiff risked contracting a deadly disease for which there was no known
cure.
Second, the Baur court suggested that there must be a "tight connection
between the type of injury which [plaintiff] alleges and the fundamental
goals of the statutes which he sues under . ... "371 The plaintiff in Baur
sued because the USDA's policy increased the risk of his contracting vCJD.
The USDA's founding statute states, "It is essential in the public interest
that the health and welfare of consumers be protected by assuring that meat
and meat food products . . . are wholesome .. . ."372 These two
qualifications-that the potential injury be grave and that Congress must
have vested the defendant with a duty to protect the public from the
injury-will help to limit the types and number of suits brought against
government agencies.
Since the framing, citizen suits have been contemplated, authorized, and
routine for federal courts. 373 The limits on a citizen's ability to bring suit
against a government agency are a recent invention, designed to accelerate
judicial docket management and, alternatively, to expand the federal
government's power. 374 Seeking to protect New Deal legislation in the first
half of the century and expand executive power in the second half of the
century, the Supreme Court crafted standing in a way that rejected history
3 75
and insulated the government from legitimate judicial intervention.
These restrictions occurred at precisely the moment in history when
American citizens most needed the ability to sue the government. With the
rise of administrative agencies, Americans are being affected on a daily
basis and exposed to risks never before imagined, sometimes due to the
negligent or nonexistent regulation of manufacturers by democratically
unaccountable administrative agencies. The Supreme Court repeatedly
stresses that its decisions about standing propel an invigorated
understanding and enforcement of separation of powers, yet it cannot speak
out of both sides of its mouth. Advocating a limited role for the judiciary
while striking down congressionally authorized citizen-suits tramples on the
democratic will and strengthens the politically unaccountable judiciary at
37 6
the expense of the legislature.
Recent Supreme Court precedent indicates that the Court is willing to
expand the definition of injury-in-fact to include even marginal increases in

370. See supra notes 278-88 and accompanying text.
371. Baur, 352 F.3d at 635.

372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

21 U.S.C. § 602 (2006).
See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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risk of harm. 377 The Court's holdings in Akins, Laidlaw, and especially in
Massachusetts, indicate a growing awareness of the Court's potential in
adjudicating these claims. The Court's holding in Massachusetts, which
allowed a suit to proceed based on the injury of potential, future erosion to
shorelines, particularly hints at the relaxed standard that should be adopted
by federal courts nationwide. 378 The threat to one's health is as grave as
any threat to America's shores and whenever an irreversible, serious threat
is alleged and the lack of oversight by an agency causes it, a citizen should
have access to federal courts to adjudicate his claim.
Additionally, the Baur decision addresses the concerns of the
conservative judicial mentality. First, because it limits the type of claims
brought by plaintiffs with its two-prong test, there will still be a number of
lawsuits capable of immediate dismissal for lack of standing, just as there
are presently. Second, regarding the Court's concern with adjudicating real
cases or controversies, the threat of injury is an immediate, present injury.
While it is important to heed the warning of the Lujan Court that injuries
should not be conjectural, hypothetical, or speculative, it is both a moral
and legal imperative to allow concerned citizens access to federal court as a
forum for addressing specific government policies that put them in peril.
A trademark of an actual case or controversy is zealous advocacy over a
dispute about something that has already occurred. By applying Baur to
other types of increased-risk-related injuries, well-financed, well-informed,
and passionate interest groups will be able to establish standing and present
an enthusiastic argument for their members about the illegality of an agency
decision. Thus, both temporally and procedurally, courts will be in a
constitutionally sound place to adjudicate the dispute.
A potential complication in establishing increased risk of injury as a
judicially cognizable injury lies in the first part of the Baur test, assessing
the seriousness of the potential fruition of the injury. Certainly, contracting
an incurable disease is grave. The D.C. Circuit in NRDC v. EPA admitted
that contracting skin cancer is also grave enough to constitute injury-in-fact,
though that was in the context of an environmental suit, which has a lower
bar for establishing standing. 379 If the Baur decision was applied to all
injuries including death, serious illness, and invasion of constitutionally
protected rights, then citizens would have a viable means of protecting
themselves from disinterested, unaccountable administrative agencies.
Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the
threat of invasion of one's privacy via illegal wiretapping did not give the
plaintiffs standing because they could not show that the NSA had spied on
them. 380 A citizen challenging the NSA's wiretapping could point to the
potential invasion of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unwarranted search and seizure. The NSA's charter states that it is
377.
378.
379.
380.

See supra notes 202-11 and accompanying text.
See supranote 204 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 330-35 and accompanying text.
ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007).
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fundamental to American freedom to protect the Constitution and the
citizens of the United States. Using Baur, the citizen should be able to
challenge the government's illegal wiretapping. While other prudential
doctrines, such as ripeness, separation of powers, and deference to the
executive branch on matters of national security might later nullify the case,
on standing grounds, the citizen has established injury-in-fact.
Concerns on the topic of docket management ignore the fact that once the
court has ruled on an issue of such fundamental importance as an agency
decision that puts constitutional rights at stake or increases the chances of a
U.S. citizen contracting an incurable illness that passes the first of the two
Baur prongs, that issue is binding precedent within a district, circuit, and,
ultimately, a nation. The NSA wiretapping cases, for example, would not
produce a wave of litigation. The first prong of the Baur test demands that
the increased risk of injury threatens a grave injury. In order to pass that
element of the test, the issue must be important enough to warrant federal
court intervention.
As agencies became more powerful and less
democratically accountable, the federal courts are a citizen's last hope at
protecting his health, rights, and life. Accordingly, increased risk of injury
should be a judicially cognizable injury-in-fact.
If the Supreme Court expands the definition of injury-in-fact to include
even marginal increases in risk of injury, more groups will be able to
challenge government interference with their interests. While there are
important
considerations-such
as
separation
of
powers,
countermajoritarian impulses of the Court, docket management, and the
efficient administration of government-the Baur decision represents a
responsible and considered application of an expanded definition of injuryin-fact.
CONCLUSION

Over the course of the last century, standing doctrine has taken on a life
of its own. Inconsistencies abound and are due, in large part, to the shifting
ideological makeup of the Court. Rather than defining injury-in-fact
narrowly, federal courts should simply loosen the definition of injury-infact to include increased risk of future harm as a judicially cognizable form
of injury-in-fact. As demonstrated by the Baur v. Veneman decision, doing
so would allow courts to operate within the confines of precedent,
preserving injury-in-fact as a component of the standing inquiry. Further, if
courts used the Baur test, allowing increased risk of future harm as an
injury-in-fact if the threatened injury is grave enough and the result of a
specific government policy, courts would strengthen, rather than erode,
ideals such as separation of powers by strengthening a check on
democratically unaccountable government agencies and stare decisis by
resolving important disputes once and for all.
Environmental groups, citizen watchdog groups, and even a "frequent
consumer of meat" would all be able to litigate some of the most important
issues of our day without exhausting judicial resources or reimagining the
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Constitution. Expanding the definition of judicially cognizable injuries will
allow the Court to perform its most important function, which is to protect
the rights of minority groups against the unchecked power of the majority.

Notes & Observations

